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SUMMARY 
Appropriate access to healthcare services is important for preventing the spread of disease, 
reducing hospitalizations and emergency department use, and increasing quality of life. 
However, within the United States healthcare system, there exist many disparities in access 
to care. In this thesis, we aim to quantify and assess disparities in healthcare access, for 
informed decision making towards improving access. Compared to existing methods, our 
approach allows for local-level estimates, is data-rich, and is statistically rigorous. 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we focus on access to pediatric primary care services in seven 
states. We design an optimization model to match primary care need with supply while 
taking into consideration system constraints such as health insurance acceptance and 
maximum travel distance. Output of this model enables computation of census tract-level 
average distance children must travel to reach their primary care providers and average 
congestion children face to schedule visits with their providers. We perform statistical 
inference, both between and within states, to determine whether there are significant 
disparities in travel distance and congestion. 
In Chapter 3, we focus on primary care for non-elderly adults in Georgia and how it may 
be impacted by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Specifically, we project the supply and 
need to primary care services starting from year 2013 through year 2025 under two 
scenarios: ACA implementation without Medicaid expansion and ACA implementation 
with expansion. Similar to Chapter 2, we use an optimization model to obtain census tract-
level estimates of availability and accessibility and test whether they significantly change 
by year 2025 due to ACA implementation or additional Medicaid expansion. We 
 xiv 
additionally evaluate the impact of two other policies intended to improve access: 
increasing the number of residency positions in Georgia and implementing a parity 
program so that more providers accept Medicaid insurance. 
In Chapter 4, we begin analysis of psychosocial services for Medicaid-insured children. 
Using Medicaid claims data for 34 states, we identify which providers are likely to treat 
Medicaid-insured children and their practice settings. We estimate per-provider and per-
state psychosocial service caseloads and compare across states, urbanicity/rurality, and 
provider specialties. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, we develop a modeling framework for one potential intervention to 
increase access to psychosocial services: collaboration between mental health providers 
and primary care providers. Our framework mimics providers’ making individual decisions 
on who they partner based on their unique preferences. We create this framework by 
extending congestion games into a setting in which players have their own private cost 
function for each resource and resources have their own capacities and preferences over 
the players. We construct a polynomial-time algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium for 
singleton games with non-decreasing cost functions under this setting and demonstrate our 
model for services to Medicaid-insured children in New York.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare access has been on the national policy agenda since the 1967 Report of the 
National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower [1]. An Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
report states that disparities in access to care are "among this nation's most serious 
healthcare problems" [2]. Appropriate access can increase life expectancy and quality of 
life by diagnosing and treating health conditions early and by preventing the spread of 
disease. As of 2015, about 10% of Americans under 65 years of age have no health 
insurance and nearly 25% of Americans do not have a regular primary care provider [3]. 
Access can be characterized by multiple dimensions, namely availability, accessibility, 
accommodation, affordability, and acceptability. All are necessary to eliminate health 
disparities [4]. In this thesis, we focus on the first two dimensions: availability, defined as 
the opportunity patients have to choose among different providers of healthcare services, 
varying in the service quality and patient accommodation, and accessibility, defined as the 
time and/or distance barriers that patients experience in reaching their providers [5]. Spatial 
access, referring to availability and accessibility together [6-8], is critical to promote 
preventive care and wellness, and to reduce severe health outcomes. Lack of spatial access 
to healthcare can lead to higher costs, higher emergency outbreaks, and inconsistency in 
health treatments and outcomes [9-10]. Spatial access is particularly relevant when 
addressing healthcare disparities for the Medicaid-insured population because of the 
reduced network of providers accepting Medicaid-insured patients due to low 
reimbursement rates and the burden of the required paperwork [11-16]. 
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Several methods to measure spatial access exist including population-to-provider ratios, 
distance to nearest provider, gravity models, and two-step floating catchment area models 
[7, 12]. However, these methods do not consider providers’ maximum capacities and 
artificially limit where a patient can travel to receive care. They also cannot incorporate 
population groups’ differing insurance and mobility, characteristics that affect which 
providers a patient can potentially visit, when computing overall congestion. Instead, we 
use optimization modeling, as described in [13-14] to assign patients to providers. With 
this model, we can minimize overall travel distance while using constraints to limit the 
number of patients assigned to a provider and to incorporate patients’ travel distance and 
provider preferences. 
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, we describe the access model framework, apply it 
to different healthcare services, and identify systematic disparities in access across 
geographies or due to factors influencing access. In Chapter 2, we focus on pediatric 
primary care with comparisons made within and among seven states. In Chapter 3, we 
evaluate the impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on access to adult primary care in 
Georgia between years 2013 and 2025 by projecting the supply and need of adult primary 
care visits under three scenarios: no ACA implementation, implementation without 
Medicaid expansion, and implementation with expansion. In Chapter 4, we provide a 
thorough analysis on the supply of psychosocial services available to Medicaid-insured 
children. Finally, in Chapter 5 we explore how integration of psychosocial services with 




CHAPTER 2. QUANTIFYING DISPARITIES IN 
ACCESSIBILITY AND AVAILABILITY OF PEDIATRIC 
PRIMARY CARE ACROSS MULTIPLE STATES 
2.1 Introduction 
Access to preventive health care is a major determinant of health among children [17]. 
Along with social and environmental factors, appropriate access to primary care for 
children can result in fewer missed days of school, lower emergency room utilization to 
treat ambulatory sensitive conditions, and better lifelong health [18-19]. 
Despite these benefits, children enrolled in either state Medicaid programs or state 
Children’s Health Insurance Programs (CHIP) have historically received less primary care 
than children not eligible for public insurance [11, 20]. Reducing disparities and increasing 
access to individual-centered and family-centered care, including primary care for children, 
were identified as priorities for all federally funded insurance programs, including 
Medicaid and CHIP in the federal National Quality Strategy [21]. 
Existing research has focused on identifying factors associated with systematic disparities 
including demographics, socio-economics, healthcare infrastructure and/or environmental 
factors [13, 22-23]; geographic variations using GIS-supported provider data and 
population demographics [12, 24-29]; and national summaries using individual-level 
survey data [30-32]. While these existing studies provide the foundation for understanding 
disparities in healthcare access, managing access through targeted interventions and 
policies requires a leap from current research [33]. 
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The aim of this chapter is to understand differences in spatial access to pediatric primary 
across and within states. Similar to [4], for the purposes of this chapter, we define 
availability as providers’ patient volume or time available for healthcare delivery that 
patients would experience when seeking care and accessibility as the distance barriers that 
patients would experience in reaching their providers.  
Outcomes include quantification of systematic disparities of accessibility and availability 
measured at the census tract level accompanied by a systematic geographic analysis within- 
and between-states in order to suggest interventions and to identify communities in need 
for improvement of pediatric primary care access. The states piloted in this analysis include 
southeastern states (Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina and Tennessee) and 
comparative states (California and Minnesota). The seven selected states vary significantly 
in implementation of Medicaid/CHIP programs, as well as in population size, population 
distribution, and demographics.  
Specific research questions include: 
• Are there systematic disparities in spatial access to pediatric primary care between- and 
within-states?  
• Are there systematic disparities in spatial access between publicly-insured and privately-
insured children?  
• Are there systematic disparities between children living in urban versus rural 
communities? 
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• Which communities are in need for improvement and which spatial access dimensions 
need to be targeted by policy makers? 
The approach to addressing these questions introduces a comprehensive framework for 
studying disparities in spatial access. The modeling approach is data “rich,” mathematically 
rigorous and computationally scalable, integrating large data and health policy in a 
systematic manner. As more data become available, the approach has the potential to 
provide even more specific information to target community or state-specific interventions. 
Material in this chapter has been published in final form at [34]. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Modelling Overview 
We estimate access by assigning patients and providers while accounting for the locations 
of each, the underlying need (using wellness visits by age as a proxy), patient trade-offs 
between distance and crowding, and some limits in the system.  This modeling approach 
has been found to be superior to catchment approaches, which underestimate access in 
dense areas [35] and to simple ratios of providers and population by area [14], which 
inaccurately portray access, especially at lower geographical granularity. The matching 
model also has the advantage over both catchment methods and simple ratios of accounting 
for specific types of barriers to access that are of significant concern in states with high 
poverty rates like the southeastern states, including the willingness of providers to accept 
Medicaid, and the limited transportation options of some participants.  
2.2.2 Data and Estimation Approach 
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2.2.2.1 Supply of Pediatric Primary Care 
The primary care supply consists of Family Medicine [36], Internal Medicine physicians 
[37], and General Pediatricians and Nurse Practitioners specializing in Pediatrics. 
Registered nurses and public health nurses are excluded. Providers’ practice location 
addresses are obtained from the 2013 National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
(NPPES) [38]. A maximum provider caseload of approximately 2500 patients/year is 
assumed [39]. Caseloads of General Pediatricians and Pediatric Nurse Practitioners are 
assumed to be completely devoted to pediatric care while Family and General physicians 
are assumed to devote around 10% of their caseload. Sensitivity analysis examined other 
variations on these percentages.  
The 2009 MAX Medicaid claims data obtained from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services [40] are used to determine what providers have seen Medicaid patients. 
We further used the approach in [13] to inform the constraints on provider Medicaid 
acceptance by considering the aggregated count of providers accepting Medicaid at the 
county level and using a sampling technique to specify whether a provider accepts 
Medicaid. 
2.2.2.2 Need for Pediatric Primary Care 
We focus on wellness visits, thus we apply the recommendations by the American 
Academy of Pediatrics [41] to calculate the type and frequency of wellness visits/year by 
age with an average number of visits/year equal to 8, 1.6, and 1 for 0-1, 1-5 and 6-18 age 
groups, respectively. The patient population is aggregated at the census tract level, using 
the 2010 SF2 100% census data and the 2012 American Community Survey data [42] to 
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compute the number of children in each census tract by age class along with information 
on poverty and ownership of cars, to estimate access to private transportation means.  
An estimation of the population of children at or below the minimum income-eligibility 
threshold for public coverage is derived using the cutoff thresholds published by CMS [43] 
(Table 1). We refer to this population as eligible to be publicly insured and those above the 
threshold as likely to be privately insured. We recognize the distinction is imperfect as 
some children may have both insurance types, some neither, and additional variations in 
coverage eligibility exist (e.g., medically-needy).  
Table 1. Medicaid/CHIP eligibility thresholds with respect to the Federal Poverty 











California 261% 261% 261% N/A 
Georgia 205% 149% 133% 247% 
Louisiana 212% 212% 212% 250% 
Minnesota 283% 283% 283% N/A 
Mississippi 194% 143% 133% 209% 
North Carolina 210% 210% 133% 211%(6-18) 
Tennessee 195% 142% 133% 250% 
 
We assume patients do not travel to excessively distant providers (i.e., more than 25 miles) 
as recommended by the Health Resources Services Administration and that those without 
private transportation in their household will travel a maximum distance of 10 miles [44]. 
Street-network distances are computed using the ArcGIS Network Analyst [45]. 
2.2.3 Matching Model 
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For each of our seven selected states, we apply an optimization model similar to one 
introduced in [14] to estimate served need for pediatric primary care. This model matches 
the available supply and the population-based need of services under a series of access and 
system constraints. Decision variables represent the number of patients in each census tract 
of a given age class who are assigned to a specific provider, namely 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀  and 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 , where 
index  𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 represents a census tract,  index  𝑗 ∈ 𝑃 represents a provider, index  𝑘 = 1,2,3 
denotes a specific age class, and superscripts M and O distinguish between children 
covered by public insurance and children covered by private insurance respectively. Table 
2 provides a summarized view of the set of parameters. We describe in detail the objective 
function and the constraints in the next two subsections. 
2.2.3.1 Objective Function 
We assume patients prefer to visit nearby and less congested/busy physicians; however, 
when a provider office has a high patient volume, families prefer providers or/and mid-
level providers farther away [46, 47]. Under these assumptions, the objective function of 
the optimization model is a weighted sum of the total distance traveled (which needs to be 
minimized) and of the provider preference contingent upon availability of the providers 
(which needs to be maximized). In particular, the objective function of the model is as 
follows: 








where 𝑓𝑘 is the yearly number of visits required by a patient in age class 𝑘, 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the 
distance between the centroid of census tract 𝑖 and provider 𝑗, 𝑦𝑗 is the level of congestion 
at provider 𝑗 computed as the ratio of assigned number of visits to maximum provider 
caseload, and 𝑢𝑗  is a weight assigned to each provider to ensure that physicians are 
preferred to nurse practitioners.  We note that the congestion level for Family/Internal 
Medicine is computed considering the physicians’ caseload that is devoted to visits for 
children. We thus assume that these physicians work at their maximum capacity, respecting 
the general perception of shortage of primary care supply for adult population [48]. 
The balance between the two components is controlled by a non-negative trade-off 
parameter 𝝀 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏]. Its value is empirically evaluated by performing several runs of the 
model to choose the value of the parameter such that (i) neither of the two components of 
the objective function dominates the other, and (ii) the resulting optimized decision reflects 
the fact that close neighbors experience the same travel distance and the same congestion 
level. Specifically for each state, we run the optimization model for different values of 𝝀 
and compute for each run the total distance traveled (i.e. the first element of the objective 
function), total patient satisfaction (the second element of the objective), and the Geary 
spatial autocorrelation index [49] for census tract-level travel distance and congestion. We 
then select a value for 𝝀 where neither total distance nor total patient satisfaction dominate 
and the Geary index values are below 1, denoting positive spatial autocorrelation among 
neighboring census tracts. Examples are shown in Figure 1 for Georgia and California. 
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Table 2. Parameters used in the pediatric primary care optimization model. 
Parameter Description Value Data Source 
𝒑𝒊𝒌
𝑴  Total number of publicly-insured children at 
census tract 𝑖 in age class 𝑘 
 2010 SF2 100% Census 
data, 2011 American 
Community Survey  
𝒑𝒊𝒌
𝑶  Total number of privately-insured children at 
census tract 𝑖 in age class 𝑘 
 2010 SF2 100% Census 
data, 2011 American 
Community Survey  
𝒑𝒊

















𝑴 Percentage of publicly-insured population in 
census tract 𝑖 that owns at least one vehicle 
 2010 SF2 100% Census 
data, 2011 American 
Community Survey  
𝒎𝒐𝒃𝒊
𝑶 Percentage of privately-insured population in 
census tract 𝑖 that owns at least one vehicle 
 2010 SF2 100% Census 
data, 2011 American 
Community Survey  
𝒎𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒙 Maximum allowed distance (in miles) 
between a patient and the matched provider 
25 US Department of Human 
and Health Services  [44] 
𝒎𝒐𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙  Maximum allowed distance (in miles) 
between a patient and the matched provider 
when the patient does not own a vehicle 
10  
- 
𝒅𝒊𝒋 Distance between centroid of census tract 𝑖 
and provider 𝑗 
 ArcGIS, ESRI; NPPES (for 
provider location); 2010 
SF2 100% Census data (for 
centroid location) 
𝒇𝒌 Number of yearly visits of a child in age 
class 𝑘 
 𝑓1 = 8 
 𝑓2 = 1.6 
 𝑓3 = 1 
American Academy of 
Pediatricians  [41] 
𝝀 Weight parameter for the distance component 
in the objective function 
 Experimentally evaluated 
𝒄𝒎𝒊𝒏 The minimum percentage of the total patient 
population required to be assigned to 
providers (others are considered 
“uncovered”).  
90% Experimentally evaluated 
𝑷𝑶𝑷 Total patient population  2010 SF2 100% Census 
data 
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒋 Maximum number of yearly visits of a 
provider 
Sampled from distribution [37, 52, 53] 
𝒑𝒄𝒋 Percentage of the provider’s caseload 
devoted to visits to children 
100%  if Pediatric Specialist 
10%  if Family/Internal 
Medicine physician 
[36] 
𝒍𝒄𝒋 Percentage of provider’s caseload necessary 
to remain in practice 
15%  for NC; 10% for GA, 
LA, TN; 0%  for CA, MN, MS  
Experimentally evaluated 
𝒑𝒂𝒎𝒋 Probability that provider 𝑗 accepts publicly-
insured patients 
𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑗 = 1 if provider accepts 
Medicaid/CHIP patients 
𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑗 = 0 if provider does not 
accept Medicaid/CHIP patients 
Medicaid Claims data 
𝜶𝒌 Percentage of the total patients in age class 𝑘 
that is served by pediatrics specialists 
 𝛼1 = 80% 
 𝛼2 = 70% 
 𝛼3 = 50% 
[50] 
𝒖𝒋 Disutility perceived by patients when served 
by physician 𝑗 
𝑢𝑗 = 5 if General Pediatric  
𝑢𝑗 = 40 if Family/Internal 
Medicine Physician 
𝑢𝑗 = 10 if Nurse Pediatric 






Figure 1. Normalized performance measures for different values of the trade-off 
parameter in the optimization model with the range of recommended values 
highlighted in grey, for Georgia and California. 
2.2.3.2 Model Constraints 
Constraints to the model ensure that the assignment of patients to providers mimics the 
process by which families choose primary care for their children. They are given below: 
  ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 )𝑘=1,2,3 /(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑐𝑗) = 𝑦𝑗𝑖∈𝑆   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃 (2.1a) 
  ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 )𝑘=1,2,3𝑗∈𝑃 ≥ 𝑐
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖∈𝑆    (2.1b) 
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  ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘
𝑀
𝑗∈𝑃  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 = 1,2,3  (2.1c) 
  ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘
𝑂
𝑗∈𝑃   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 = 1,2,3 (2.1d) 
  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 ≥ 0  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 = 1,2,3 (2.1e) 
  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 ≥ 0  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 = 1,2,3 (2.1f) 
  ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 )𝑘=1,2,3 = 0𝑗:𝑑𝑖𝑗≥𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 (2.1g) 






𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 (2.1h) 






𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 (2.1i) 
  ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 )𝑘=1,2,3 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑐𝑗𝑖∈𝑆   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃 (2.1j) 
  ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 )𝑘=1,2,3 ≥ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑙𝑐𝑗𝑖∈𝑆   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃 (2.1k) 
  ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 )𝑘=1,2,3 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑐𝑗𝑖∈𝑆 𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃  (2.1l) 
  ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 ) ≥ 𝛼𝑘𝑗: 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑗=1,3 ∑ ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑀 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑂 )𝑗𝑖𝑖∈𝑆   ∀𝑘 = 1,2,3 (2.1m) 
The first constraint computes provider congestion 𝑦𝑗 as used in the objective function. The 
second constraint ensures at least a given percentage of the total state population is assigned 
to providers. In particular, we set the value of parameter 𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛 to the maximum value 
allowing feasibility of the model. The resulting value is equal to 90% for each state. 
Constraints (2.1c)-(2.1f) are assignment constraints that require assignment of patients to 
providers to be nonnegative and not greater than the census tract population. Constraints 
(2.1g)-(2.1i) mimic distance barriers encountered by patients, setting a maximum 
allowable distance considering vehicle ownership. 
The next set of constraints mimics availability barriers. In particular, constraint (2.1j) 
ensures that the total number of patients assigned to each provider cannot exceed his or her 
maximum caseload. Constraint (2.1k) acknowledges that for a provider to remain in 
practice, he or she must maintain a sufficiently large number of visits per year. The value 
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of parameter 𝑙𝑐𝑗 is set for each state as the maximum value for which feasibility of the 
model was achieved. Finally, constraint (2.1l) allows for different participation in the 
Medicaid program by limiting the total number of publicly insured who can be assigned to 
each provider. 
The final constraint specifies that pediatric specialists cover a greater percentage of visits 
to children [50, 51] with respect to Family/Internal Medicine physicians. To this end, these 
constraints ensure that a given percentage 𝛼𝑘 of the total patients in age class 𝑘 are served 
by pediatric physicians and pediatric nurse practitioners. 
2.2.4 Accessibility and Availability Measures 
The solution produced by the optimization model is used to compute census tract-level 
accessibility and availability measures for primary care for all children, children eligible 
for public insurance, and children likely to be privately insured. Accessibility is quantified 
as the average distance a child in a census tract must travel for each visit to his/her matched 
provider, thus smaller values of the measure indicate better accessibility. Availability is 
quantified by the congestion a child experiences for each visit at his/her matched provider, 
where patient congestion is measured as the ratio between all assigned visits to a provider 
and his/her maximum caseload; thus smaller values indicate better availability. Children 
experiencing a distance of 25 miles or greater are assumed to be “unserved” by the existing 
network. Hence, the output represents the served need, which may be smaller than the need 
itself. 
Extensive analysis was conducted to assess the sensitivity of the access estimates to 
variations in input data. We first tested the sensitivity of the model with respect to the 
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percentage of providers’ caseload devoted to children by varying parameter 𝑝𝑐𝑗 within 
range 0%-10% for internists and 7%-15% for family practitioners. Output measures were 
not found to be very sensitive to these changes. Full results are provided in Appendix A.1. 
For provider workload, 50 different parameter settings of the model were considered by 
varying the caseload for each provider. Specifically, for each provider, gender was 
identified from NPPES information [38]. The age of that provider was then sampled from 
a normal distribution fit on data from [52] given their gender. Finally, that provider’s 
caseload was determined according to their gender and sampled age using data derived 
from [53]. Details on these distributions are given in Appendix A.2. This process was 
repeated for all providers 50 times, and the caseloads obtained after each repetition were 
input into the optimization model for 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗. Thus, our output consists of 50 values of 
accessibility and availability measures for each census tract. We summarize the results 
based on all 50 settings. 
2.2.5 Systemic Disparities: Measures and Statistical Inference 
2.2.5.1 Between-State Disparities 
To evaluate whether between-state disparities in accessibility and availability are 
systematic, we apply the one-sided hypothesis test of difference in the medians using the 
Wilcoxon signed-ranked test, for each pair of states and for each population group. This 
hypothesis test applies under the independence assumption, which does not hold since the 
access measures are spatially dependent. Because of this limitation, the test is more 
conservative in detecting differences between states. 
 15 
Most papers in disparities compare whether any difference exists (i.e., 𝛿 = 0). We consider 
multiple levels of differences to gain understanding of how large differences are, if they 
exist. The null hypothesis difference in medians thus takes three different levels for both 
accessibility and spatial availability:  
• 𝛿 = 0, 𝛿 = 1 or 𝛿 = 2 miles for the accessibility measure; and  
• 𝛿 = 0.0, 𝛿 = 0.1 or 𝛿 = 0.2 patient-to-provider caseload ratio for the availability 
measure. 
2.2.5.2 Within-Sate Disparities 
We group census tracts into three categories according to their rural-urban commuting area 
code (RUCA) [54]. We classify the census tracts as Large Urban Areas (RUCA = 1-3), 
Small Urban Areas (RUCA = 4-6), and Rural Areas (RUCA = 7-10). We then compare 
disparities in accessibility and availability between publicly-eligible children and children 
likely to be privately insured. 
2.2.5.3 Intervention Maps 
We identify served, underserved and unserved census tracts if the percentage of served 
need is at least 80%, between 50% and 80%, and less than 50%, respectively; these levels 
can be adjusted depending on the coverage targeted. 
Using the method described in Serban [55] we identify the specific tracts where the 
difference in either accessibility or availability between the children eligible for public 
insurance and those who are likely to be privately insured is statistically significant. 
Specifically, we consider the difference process 𝑍(𝑠) = 𝑀(𝑠) − 𝑂(𝑠) for each spatial unit 
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𝑠 (i.e., census tract) within a geographic domain (e.g. state). We decompose 𝑍(𝑠) = 𝑓(𝑠) +
𝜖𝑠, with 𝑓(𝑠) the regression function assumed unknown and estimated using nonparametric 
penalized splines regression through the mgcv library in the R statistical software. 
Subsequently, we use the existing methods proposed by Serban [55], and Krivobokova et 
al. [56] to estimate simultaneous confidence bands [𝑙(𝑠), 𝑢(𝑠)] for the regression 
function 𝑓(𝑠). For those spatial units 𝑠 or regions such that 𝑢(𝑠) < 0, the difference is 
significantly negative, while for those spatial units 𝑠 such that 𝑙(𝑠) > 0, the difference is 
significantly positive. The results are displayed as point maps, where the points correspond 
to the centroids of the census tracts where the difference process 𝑍(𝑠) is significantly 
negative or positive, defined as significance maps. A significance level of 0.01 is used. 
2.3 Results 
The study population represents more than 9 million children across approximately 16,500 
census tracts served by a network of more than 17,000 unique provider locations 
representing around 76,000 individual and group providers.  
2.3.1 Between-State Disparities 
Figure 2 displays the boxplots of the median of the access measures computed at the census 
tract level across all 50 settings for all census tracts in each of the seven states and for each 
population group. The median state-level distance to care for children eligible for public 
insurance ranges from 7.54 to 9.79 miles. For children likely to be privately insured, it 
ranges from 4.78 to 8.50 miles. The median state-level congestion for children eligible for 
public insurance ranges from 0.40 to 0.74. For children likely to be privately insured, it 
ranges from 0.39 to 0.70. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of medians of travel distance (in miles) and medians of 
congestion for different population groups. Each boxplot represents the distribution 
across census tracts after taking the median across the 50 runs for each census tract. 
For each run, we apply the one-sided Wilcoxon test for comparison of medians of distance 
(in miles) for each pair of states (H0: μState1-μState2≤δ vs. H1: μState1-μState2>δ) for the children 
eligible for public insurance (Public) and children above the income threshold for public 
insurance (Private). Table 3 summarizes the results of these statistical comparisons with 
State 1 specified by the row and State 2 by the column. A symbol “*”, “**“, and “***” in 
the cell indicates a p-value less than or equal to 0.01 in at least 75% of the runs for null 
difference in medians δ=0, δ=1, and δ=2 respectively. The comparisons between 
congestion medians are similarly summarized for null difference in medians δ=0.0, δ=0.1, 
and δ=0.2 in Table 4.  
Comparing accessibility (Table 3, null value 𝛿 = 0), each state except  Louisiana has a 
higher median distance than California for the eligible population, and all states have a 
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higher median distance than California for the population likely to be privately insured; 
some differences remain significant at distance 𝛿 ≤ 2 miles for the population likely to be 
privately insured. Mississippi has higher median distance than all the other states for the 
eligible population, and it has a higher distance than all the other states, except North 
Carolina, for the population likely to be privately insured. Several states have higher 
median distance than Louisiana or Minnesota (𝛿 = 0 miles) for both population groups. 
There are no comparisons between pairs of states where the difference is statistically 
significant for 𝛿 ≥ 2 miles.  
Comparing availability (Table 4, null value 𝛿 = 0), Mississippi has a higher median 
congestion for both the population groups than all the other states. Minnesota has a higher 
median congestion for both the population groups than all the other states except 
Mississippi. All states except North Carolina have a higher median congestion than 
Louisiana for children eligible for public insurance insured. Additionally, all states except 
North Carolina and Tennessee have higher median congestion for children likely to be 
privately insured. All differences in medians are not statistically significant for 𝛿 ≥ 0.1. 
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Table 3. Between-state differences in median distance (in miles) a child must travel 
for visits to matched providers, by insurance type, averaged across 50 runs. 
States CA GA LA MN 
  Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
CA         -0.8082   -2.3116   0.8931   0.5933   -0.6064   -2.9870   
GA 0.8082 * 2.3116 *     -1.0000   1.7013 * 2.9049 * 0.2018 * -0.6754   
LA -0.8931   -0.5933 * -1.7013   -2.9049       -1.0000   -1.4996   -3.5804   
MN 0.6064 * 2.9870 * -0.2018   0.6754   1.4996   3.5804 *         
MS 2.4092 ** 4.7211 *** 1.6010 * 2.4095 * 3.3024 ** 5.3144 ** 1.8028 ** 1.7341 * 
NC 0.8453 * 3.2631 *** 0.0371 * 0.9515 * 1.7384 * 3.8564 ** 0.2389 * 0.2761 * 
TN 1.1832 * 2.4998 ** 0.3750   0.1882   2.0763 * 3.0931 * 0.5768 * -0.4872   
States MS NC TN     
  Public Private Public Private Public Private     
CA -2.4092   -4.7211   -0.8453   -3.2631   -1.1832   -2.4998       
GA -1.6010   -2.4095   -0.0371   -0.9515   -0.3750   -0.1882       
LA -3.3024   -5.3144   -1.7384   -3.8564   -2.0763   -3.0931       
MN -1.8028   -1.7341   -0.2389   -0.2761   -0.5768   0.4872       
MS         1.5639 * 1.4580   1.2260 * 2.2213 *     
NC -1.5639   -1.4580           -0.3379   0.7633 *     
TN -1.2260   -2.2213   0.3379   -0.7633               
 
Table 4. Between-state differences in median congestion, measured as the ratio 
between all assigned visits to a provider and his/her maximum caseload, by insurance 
type, averaged across 50 runs. 
States CA GA LA MN 
  Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
CA         0.0282 * 0.0653 * 0.0836 * 0.1127 * -0.1192   -0.1312   
GA -0.0282   -0.0653         0.0554 * 0.0474 * -0.1474   -0.1965   
LA -0.0836   -0.1127   -0.0554   -0.0474         -0.2028   -0.2439   
MN 0.1192 * 0.1312 * 0.1474 * 0.1965 * 0.2028 * 0.2439 *       
MS 0.2619 * 0.2519 * 0.2901 * 0.3172 * 0.3456 * 0.3647 * 0.1428 * 0.1207 * 
NC -0.1632   -0.1935   -0.1350   -0.1282   -0.0796   -0.0808   -0.2824   -0.3247   
TN -0.0522   -0.0994   -0.0240   -0.0340   0.0314 * 0.0134   -0.1713   -0.2306   
States MS NC TN     
  Public Private Public Private Public Private     
CA -0.2619   -0.2519   0.1632 * 0.1935 * 0.0522 * 0.0994 *     
GA -0.2901   -0.3172   0.1350 * 0.1282 * 0.0240   0.0340       
LA -0.3456   -0.3647   0.0796   0.0808   -0.0314   -0.0134       
MN -0.1428   -0.1207   0.2824 * 0.3247 * 0.1713 * 0.2306 *     
MS         0.4251 * 0.4455 * 0.3141 * 0.3513 *     
NC -0.4251   -0.4455           -0.1110   -0.0942       
TN -0.3141   -0.3513   0.1110 * 0.0942               
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2.3.2 Within-State Disparities 
Table 5 shows differences in median travel distance (in miles) and median congestion of 
children eligible for public insurance vs. children above the income threshold for public 
insurance, averaged across the 50 runs. For each run, the Wilcoxon paired statistical test 
(H0: μPublic - μPrivate ≤ δ; H1: μPublic - μPrivate > δ) was applied for each state for three different 
values of the hypothesized difference δ for the three different urbanicity classifications of 
the census tracts. A symbol “*”, “**“, or “***” in the cell indicates a median p-value less 
than or equal to α/4 (α=0.01), as specified in Bonferroni’s method for correcting for 
multiple hypothesis tests, over the 50 runs for the three levels of difference δ respectively 
(δ=0, δ=1, and δ=2 for distance and δ=0.0, δ=0.1, and δ=0.2 for congestion). 
Table 5. Within-state differences in median travel distance (in miles) and median 
congestion, averaged across 50 runs. 
  Distance - Medians Congestion - Medians 
  State Large Urban Small Urban Rural State Large Urban Small Urban Rural 
California 3.3381 *** 5.8216 *** 2.3172 *** 9.7767 *** 0.0133 * 0.0064 * 0.1217 * 0.3611 * 
Georgia 1.8348 * 2.2379 * 1.2642 * 1.6948 * 0.0504 * 0.0474 * 0.0509 * 0.0842 * 
Louisiana 3.0383 * 2.6598 * 1.0970 * 1.9829 * 0.0424 * 0.0591 * 0.0394 * 0.0497 * 
Minnesota 0.9575 * 0.5092 * 1.0071 * 1.2097 * 0.0012 * -0.0188  0.0333 * 0.0424 * 
Mississippi 1.0263 * 1.3521 * 0.9263 * 1.2245 * 0.0233 * 0.0048  0.0545 * 0.0316  
North 
Carolina 
0.9203 * 0.5494 * 0.6730 * 1.3608 * 0.0436 * 0.0000 * 0.0327 * 0.0858 * 
Tennessee 2.0216 * 2.2643 * 1.9465 * 2.4214 ** 0.0605 * 0.0504 * 0.1124 * 0.0671 * 
 
Median distance for the eligible children is statistically significantly higher than for 
children likely to be privately insured in each state and for all three urbanicity classes for 
a difference of 𝛿 = 0 miles. The differences remain statistically significant at 𝛿 ≤ 2 miles 
for California for areas all urbanicity classes. These differences are not statistically 
significant for 𝛿 ≥ 2 for all the other states. 
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The eligible population has higher congestion in each state and for each urbanicity level 
with few exceptions at the null value 𝛿 = 0.0. These differences are not statistically 
significant for 𝛿 ≥ 0.1.  
Comparisons of medians of distance and congestion of children likely to be privately 
insured versus children eligible for public insurance across urban and rural census tracts 
are shown in Figure 3. The median distances for children eligible for public insurance range 
from 6.13 (large urban areas in Minnesota) to the maximum of 17.91 miles (rural areas in 
California). The median distances for children likely to be privately insured range from 
4.44 (large urban areas in California) to 13.49 (rural areas in California) miles. The median 
congestion values for children eligible for public insurance range from 0.35 in large urban 
areas in North Carolina to the maximum of 0.79 in rural areas in California. The median 
congestion values for children likely to be privately insured range from 0.35 in large urban 
areas in North Carolina to 0.77 in rural areas in Mississippi. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of census tract-level travel distance and congestion for publicly-
insured (grey box) and privately-insured (white box) children in each urbanicity level 
for each state, after taking the median value across the 50 runs. 
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2.3.3 Intervention Analysis 
For each run, we label each census tract as either served, underserved, or unserved based 
on its percentage of served need. Table 6 lists the average number of census tracts falling 
into each of the three categories across the 50 runs along with the 10th percentile and 90th 
percentile number of census tracts in parentheses. Figure 4 maps the category of each 
census tract based on its average percentage of served need across the 50 runs.   
Table 6. Average [10th percentile, 90th percentile] number of census tracts across the 
50 runs that are served, underserved, and unserved by state and urbanicity. 
State Service Level Entire State Large Urban Small Urban Rural  
CA 
Served 7046 [7041, 7051] 6795 [6790, 6800] 195 [193, 196] 56 [54, 57] 
Underserved 576 [567, 583] 481 [474, 488] 44 [43, 47] 51 [49, 54] 
Unserved 378 [375, 382] 222 [219, 225] 54 [53, 55] 102 [101, 104] 
GA 
Served 1595 [1593, 1597] 1365 [1363, 1367] 152 [151, 152] 79 [78, 79] 
Underserved 234 [231, 236] 153 [151, 156] 40 [39, 41] 41 [39, 42] 
Unserved 126 [125, 128] 72 [71, 73] 28 [27, 28] 27 [26, 28] 
LA 
Served 959 [957, 960] 818 [817, 819] 78 [77, 78] 63 [62, 64] 
Underserved 98 [96, 100] 58 [57, 59] 18 [18, 19] 22 [20, 23] 
Unserved 68 [66, 69] 42 [42, 42] 4 [4, 4] 22 [20, 23] 
MN 
Served 1118 [1116, 1120] 866 [865, 868] 116 [115, 117] 136 [135, 137] 
Underserved 122 [120, 124] 43 [41, 44] 22 [22, 23] 57 [55, 59] 
Unserved 94 [93, 95] 14 [14, 15] 15 [15, 15] 65 [64, 66] 
MS 
Served 558 [556, 560] 258 [257, 259] 194 [193, 195] 106 [104, 107] 
Underserved 76 [74, 78] 27 [26, 28] 20 [19, 21] 29 [28, 31] 
Unserved 21 [21, 22] 6 [6, 6] 9 [9, 9] 6 [6, 6] 
NC 
Served 1828 [1825, 1831] 1439 [1437, 1442] 280 [278, 283] 108 [106, 109] 
Underserved 222 [218, 225] 129 [126, 132] 50 [47, 52] 43 [41, 46] 
Unserved 120 [118, 121] 62 [61, 64] 23 [22, 24] 35 [34, 36] 
TN 
Served 1215 [1213, 1217] 963 [961, 964] 156 [154, 157] 97 [95, 98] 
Underserved 174 [170, 177] 91 [88, 92] 48 [47, 50] 35 [33, 37] 












North Carolina Tennessee 
 
 
Figure 4. Map of census tracts that are served (light-grey; at least 80% of population 
assigned to a provider on average across the 50 runs), underserved (grey; 50-80% of 
population assigned on average), or unserved (black; less than 50% of population 
assigned on average). White-shaded census tracts were not included in the analysis. 
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The average percentage of served census tracts across the 50 settings ranges from 82% 
(Georgia and Tennessee) to 88% (California); the average percentage of underserved 
census tracts ranges from 7% (California) to 12% (Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee); 
the average percentage of unserved census tracts ranges from 3% (Mississippi) to 7% 
(Minnesota).  
Census tracts identified as served or unserved tend to be located in a subset of counties, 
while those identified as underserved are in many counties dispersed around the state.  The 
served tracts tend to be located in large urban areas. The percentage of large urban census 
tracts among the served census tracts ranges between 46% (Mississippi) to 96% 
(California).  The unserved census tracts are located in large urban areas in all the states 
except Minnesota where they are mostly located in rural areas (69%) and Mississippi where 
they are located in small urban tracts (43%). 
Results from significance maps are summarized in Table 7 and Table 8, which show for 
travel distance and congestion respectively the total number of census tracts where the 
publicly-insured population has a statistically significantly greater value (lower access) 
than the privately-insured population, at α = 0.01 significance level in at least 75% of the 
runs. The column ‘Tot’ also contains the percentage of census tracts in the state meeting 
that criteria while the ‘Large Urban’, ‘Small Urban’, and ‘Rural’ columns contain the 
percentage of census tracts in each urbanicity category computed with respect to the total 
in the corresponding ‘Tot’ column. Results are reported for different values of the threshold 
δ. 
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The percentage of census tracts where children eligible for public insurance need to travel 
further to access care than the children likely to be privately insured ranges from 22% 
(North Carolina) to 71% (California). For =2 miles, the percentage varies from 0% 
(Mississippi and Minnesota) to 35% (California) including many in large urban areas.  
There are relatively fewer census tracts where children eligible for public insurance have 
lower availability than the other children. The percentage of census tracts where the public 
insurance eligible experience higher congestion than the children likely to be privately 
insured ranges from 7% in Minnesota, Mississippi, and North Carolina to 24% in 
California. At 𝛿=0.0, the tracts where availability is lowest for the public insurance eligible 
tend to be more concentrated in small urban and rural areas in Minnesota and Mississippi 
and more concentrated in large urban areas in the other states. 
Table 7. Number (percent) of census tracts where the publicly-insured population has 
a significantly greater travel distance than the privately-insured population at 𝜶 =




















California 5711 (71%) 5402 (95%) 174 (3%) 135 (2%) 4262 (53%) 4008 (94%) 137 (3%) 117 (3%) 2778 (35%) 2566 (92%) 114 (4%) 98 (4%)
Georgia 973 (50%) 866 (89%) 60 (6%) 47 (5%) 364 (19%) 322 (88%) 17 (5%) 25 (7%) 140 (7%) 122 (87%) 4 (3%) 14 (10%)
Louisiana 425 (38%) 376 (88%) 11 (3%) 38 (9%) 147 (13%) 128 (87%) 1 (1%) 18 (12%) 37 (3%) 30 (81%) 1 (3%) 6 (16%)
Minnesota 1194 (90%) 851 (71%) 121 (10%) 222 (19%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Mississippi 592 (90%) 289 (49%) 183 (31%) 120 (20%) 125 (19%) 90 (72%) 27 (22%) 8 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
North Carolina 485 (22%) 317 (65%) 105 (22%) 63 (13%) 129 (6%) 86 (67%) 24 (19%) 19 (15%) 12 (1%) 11 (92%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%)





Table 8. Number (percent) of census tracts where the publicly-insured population has 
a significantly greater congestion than the privately-insured population at 𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
significance level in at least 75% of the runs. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
This study uncovers systematic differences and disparities in accessibility and availability 
of pediatric primary care across seven states for public insurance eligible and children 
above the income threshold for public insurance. Disparities are quantified between- and 
within-states, comparing public insurance eligible versus likely to be privately insured 
children and across three urbanicity levels.  
The study also introduces a framework that can be used to help support policymaking.  The 
objective is to identify where the communities with the greatest need for improvement are 
and which spatial access dimensions need be targeted by policy makers in order to increase 
access to primary care for children. This framework will be especially useful if local data 
is available and the model assumptions adjust to fit the data.   
The between-state pairwise comparisons reveal that children above the income threshold 
for public insurance have the best median accessibility in California, and public insurance 
eligible children have the best median accessibility in California, Minnesota and Louisiana. 

















California 1949 (24%) 1756 (90%) 96 (5%) 97 (5%) 727 (9%) 630 (87%) 40 (6%) 57 (8%) 179 (2%) 155 (87%) 9 (5%) 15 (8%)
Georgia 340 (17%) 217 (64%) 71 (21%) 52 (15%) 60 (3%) 60 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Louisiana 175 (16%) 140 (80%) 15 (9%) 20 (11%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Minnesota 99 (7%) 6 (6%) 38 (38%) 55 (56%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Mississippi 47 (7%) 0 (0%) 33 (70%) 14 (30%) 14 (2%) 0 (0%) 13 (93%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
North Carolina 149 (7%) 96 (64%) 32 (21%) 21 (14%) 2 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)





disparities between states exist, they are not significant for pairwise comparisons when 
considering intervention levels of a difference ≥1 mile in travel distance (except for 
comparisons with California) or a difference ≥0.1 in experienced congestion (except for 
comparison with Minnesota and Mississippi). This is an important finding as many 
disparity studies have only drawn inferences at zero absolute differences between states or 
between population groups [57-60]. While there are disparities between states, they are 
significant at low comparison levels, suggesting that within-state disparities are more 
relevant than those between states.  
The within-state systematic disparities are more nuanced when comparing accessibility and 
availability for the two population groups and across urbanicity levels. In general, we do 
find that public insurance eligible children experience lower access than children above the 
income threshold for public insurance. However, the difference in accessibility is >1 mile 
only for California, and for rural areas in Tennessee. The differences in availability are less 
systematic, with significant differences only for the level equal to 0.  
The intervention analysis shows that the areas of lower spatial access can be found 
throughout a state across all urbanicity levels. Eligible children have worse spatial access 
than children likely to be privately insured across all the urbanicity levels. These findings 
highlight the importance of identifying specific areas where interventions are needed, with 
interventions targeted to the type of spatial access in need of improvement.  
The findings for specific states may offer some guidance on where and how to target 
resources. For example, California has the greatest opportunity to improve accessibility for 
the public insurance eligible children as it has the largest percentage of communities 
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(53%) where the eligible children need to travel more than 1 mile further than the other 
children, in contrast to all other states for which the percentage ranges between 0% in 
Minnesota to 24% in Tennessee.  
For other states such as Georgia and Minnesota, census tracts with high accessibility are 
geographically clustered, especially in urban areas, while being significantly worse for 
publicly-insured children in some of those same areas. For the same states, communities 
with low availability are spread throughout the state, thus interventions to improve 
availability are more challenging to implement since the communities in need are spread 
throughout the state as compared to interventions for improving accessibility. These 
findings suggest interventions need to be targeted to the local need, combining both policy 
interventions for improving public insurance acceptance by providers already in practice 
and network interventions that add providers to some areas (e.g. telehealth, school-based 
health centers, and mobile clinics).  
In states such as Tennessee, North Carolina and Louisiana, public insurance eligible  
children experience lower accessibility and availability throughout the state, indicating that 
investments in multiple types of statewide interventions would be needed, particularly 
policy interventions targeting access for publicly-insured children. In states such as 
Mississippi, spatial access is systematically low both populations, thus targeting network 
interventions that would lead to an increase in the primary care providers, both physician 
and mid-level providers, will have the highest impact. 
2.5 Limitations 
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This study has several limitations, many of which stemming primarily from the limited 
availability of detailed data. First, we used income thresholds for public insurance 
programs to estimate the numbers of children who are publicly insured. Because the ACS 
data used to estimate household income are not the same as the units of measure for 
insurance eligibility and low income populations are more likely to live in multi-family 
households, the model may underestimate the number of children eligible for public 
insurance.  
Second, because no single data source exists that identifies all providers who provide 
primary care to children or that quantifies caseload, we have used multiple data sources 
and a series of assumptions; thus, supply and locations of service may have been under or 
overestimated. To know the supply of health care providers, we used the NPEES database 
for information on geolocation for each provider and on provider type.  NPPES provides 
provider-level data on both specialty and location; however, it has limitations. Since some 
nurse practitioners bill under physician’s national provide index (NPI), the supply of 
pediatric primary care may be underestimated. This may be offset by the fact some 
physicians spent significant time in supervising mid-level providers as well as residents, 
interns and fellows. Moreover, some providers may practice from different offices, while 
only the business address is provided with the provider’s NPI.  We also use the MAX files 
for obtaining information on the Medicaid acceptance rates, although Medicaid MAX files 
can have data quality issues, especially for states with large populations on managed care 
[61]. We did not capture the differences among states of the variation of providers’ 
caseload devoted to the publicly insured. It is also possible that there are some providers 
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who would see patients on CHIP but not patients on Medicaid, and this is not captured in 
our data.  
Third, household level data on transportation options by income thresholds for eligibility 
for public insurance were not available, so we compare the estimated income derived from 
census data with the federal net-income thresholds instead of modified adjusted-gross 
income (MAGI)-equivalent minimum thresholds as defined in federal public insurance 
coverage laws and regulations.  
A final limitation is the set of assumptions specifying some of the system constraints. We 
assume the maximum provider capacity is the same across all providers. We assume the 
same maximum willingness to travel for populations in both rural and urban areas. We do 
not account for changes in the percentage of physicians practicing pediatric primary care 
after 2013. We are also estimating need for pediatric care using recommendations for 
wellness visits for children. We do not include visits for minor illnesses or more intensive 
care for children with chronic or complex conditions. Thus we underestimate the level of 
access for some children. We assume that the disutility of crowding is linear although in 
other papers we have shown how the model can incorporate nonlinear functions. We also 
estimate matches between patients and providers assuming a centralized framework; in 
other papers we have shown how the model can incorporate decentralized decision making 
with patients maximizing their own individual welfare. 
Overall, most of the above stated assumptions can be relaxed with the acquisition of local-
level, detailed data. This would be paired with minor modifications to the model used to 
account for the provider-specific or geographical-specific data. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
Even though this study has limitations, it has potential implications for public health and 
health care policy.  While concerns about the availability of primary care providers have 
been expressed within recent health policy, this study finds that across states the disparities 
in availability for pediatric primary care are not as significant as the disparities in 
accessibility. Moreover, contrary to some beliefs, despite potential gains in insurance 
coverage over the last several years, both rural and urban communities are in need for 
improvement of accessibility to primary care for publicly-insured children. 
More generally, the findings in this study suggest that some policies will be more effective 
than others in addressing disparities in spatial access, while the policy recommendations 
depend on the state. For some states, incentivizing providers to accept public insurance 
could improve spatial access for public insurance eligible children, but incentivizing 
providers in some other states would not generate the same result since access for children 
likely to be privately insured also needs improvement.  For all states, since unserved 
communities are spread across counties, interventions to provide access to pediatric 
primary care for these communities need to be more targeted, e.g., school telehealth clinics 
at school-based health centers.  
The study thus shows that generating specific recommendations for small areas within 
states is needed to shift the needle on access to care for children. This can be done with 
additional data specific to local areas with minor modifications to the model. Continuing 
to refine the model and data will ensure that the approach is reliable and accurate, while 
promoting the use of interventions that are most appropriate in a given locale.  
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CHAPTER 3. PROJECTING THE IMPACT OF AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT PROVISIONS ON ACCESSIBILITY AND 
AVAILABILITY OF PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS FOR THE 
ADULT POPULATION IN GEORGIA 
3.1 Introduction 
Several policy interventions have been implemented and evaluated to improve healthcare 
access, to ultimately reduce health disparities [5, 62]. The most recent and comprehensive 
among these interventions are the provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA). One primary emphasis of ACA is to eliminate disparities in financial access to 
healthcare, particularly, for the most disadvantaged populations. While affordability (i.e., 
financial access) is an essential dimension of healthcare access, other dimensions such as 
availability and accessibility are equally relevant to reduce health disparities. Improving 
spatial access, referring to availability and accessibility together, is especially important 
for the Medicaid-insured population due to a smaller network of providers accepting 
Medicaid insurance [11, 15, 16]. 
Because ACA’s implementation will transform healthcare delivery in ways that are not 
fully understood, it is expected to have unintended consequences that could counteract its 
overall benefits. For example, although the ACA primarily focuses on financial access, it 
will also impact other forms of healthcare access. Availability and accessibility are 
functions of the available network of providers (supply) and of the patients accessing the 
healthcare services (demand/need). These will be greatly affected by the main provisions 
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of the ACA, including the individual mandate, the exchange insurance market, the end of 
the pre-existing health condition exclusions, and the optional expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility, but also by provisions that could result in an increase in the number of primary 
care providers and/or the acceptance rate of the Medicaid insurance program. 
Many studies [53, 63-66] forecast that the resulting increase in the demand of care due to 
these provisions may not be adequately supported by the supply of healthcare services, 
with an estimated need of primary care physicians of around 20,400 in 2020 as provided 
by [53], for example. This is a concern because too few physicians or inadequate supply 
could lead to services being delayed or forgone altogether. The delay may worsen health 
conditions, eventually resulting in an increase of severe health outcomes. 
Although most existing studies on the impact of the ACA provisions provide nationwide 
or state-level projections [53, 66-68], the projected impact will vary geographically 
because of the pre-existing disparities in access and because of the variations in the 
implementation of the ACA and state-level health policies. Understanding the ACA’s 
projected impact on other dimensions of healthcare access locally at the community-level 
is paramount in facilitating targeted interventions and most effective resource allocation 
[69-70]. 
The aim of this chapter is to project how spatial access is impacted by the implementation 
of the ACA for the non-elderly adult population.  The questions we address are: 
• What is the projected impact of ACA without Medicaid expansion on availability and 
accessibility of primary care providers geographically and over time?  
 35 
• What is the projected burden of opting for Medicaid expansion on availability and 
accessibility of primary care providers geographically and over time? 
• Does a higher rate of Medicaid insurance acceptance by providers or/and an increase of 
the overall supply result in an improvement in the served need for primary care services? 
The methods include three models: a supply-projection model, a need-projection model, 
and an optimization model. The supply and need models predict the total number of 
available (supply) and needed primary care visits for each year from 2013 (the baseline 
year) until 2025. The optimization model estimates served need for primary care visits by 
matching the projected supply and need under a series of access constraints. Availability 
and accessibility are projected at the census tract level by contrasting served to needed 
visits. 
We pilot our study for the state of Georgia, but the proposed models can be generalized 
and applied to other states in the U.S. Material in this chapter has been published at [71]. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Study Population 
The study population consists of all adults age 19-64 living in Georgia. The Medicare 
population is excluded since the Medicaid and the exchange market primarily impact the 
insurance status of the population younger than 65. The child population is also excluded 
since the Medicaid expansion does not apply to this population. 
3.2.2 Data Sources 
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Data sources used for the supply projection model include the 2013 National Plan & 
Provider Enumeration System (NPPES) [38], the Georgia Board for Physician Workforce's 
2013 Spotlight on Graduate Medical Education [72], the Georgia Board for Physician 
Workforce's 2008 Basic Physician Reports [73], the Centers for Disease Control's National 
Vital Statistics Reports [74], the 2007-2011 American Community Survey (ACS) County-
to-County Migration Flows by Educational Attainment table [75], and the 2012 ACS 
Educational Attainment table [42].  
Data sources used for need projections include the Governor's Office of Planning and 
Budget's residential population projections [76], the 2010 Census and the 2012 and 2013 
American Community Surveys [42], 2006 median income data from Environmental 
Systems Research Institute [77], estimates from Kaiser Family Foundation/Urban Institute 
- Table ES-3 [78], and Congressional Budget office estimates – Table 3 [79]. 
An additional data source for the optimization model is the 2009 MAX Medicaid patient-
level claims files [40].  
Provider addresses are geocoded using the Texas A&M Geocoding Services [80], and 
street-network distances between census tract centroids and provider addresses are 
computed using the ArcGIS Network Analyst [45]. 
3.2.3 Supply Projection Model 
According to the definition of Primary Care of the Institute of Medicine’s Committee [81], 
primary care providers include general and family medicine and general internal medicine, 
including physicians, Nurse Practitioners (NPs) and Physician Assistants (PAs). We use 
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NPPES to identify these providers, both to additionally obtain their specific location 
information and to avoid inconsistences in other databases [82]. We consider only 
individual provider records [83]. 
The supply-projection model consists of three steps: county-level projections of active 
workforce, distribution of projected supply across census tracts, and conversion of 
available supply in number of visits, all obtained yearly and for all counties. These steps, 
as well as alternate supply scenarios that we consider, are detailed in the next subsections. 
3.2.3.1 County-level Projections 
In the first step, a stock-and-flow model [84] computes the total number of active 
physicians yearly by considering the current level of physicians plus the net flow. The net 
flow is the difference between new entrants in the workforce (new graduates practicing in 
Georgia and immigrants) and exit from the workforce (due to retirement, death, profession 
change, and emigration) [53]. The model includes two modules, the Student and Workforce 
Modules. Output of these modules was found to be comparable to national-level 
projections, suggesting their validity (see Appendix B.1 for details). 
The Student Module determines the number of students completing graduate medical 
education in Georgia and entering the workforce for the first time, assuming that students 
graduate after three years [72, 85]. After completing the residency, students either emigrate 
from Georgia or join the Georgia physician population, where they may choose to practice 
in other specialties or in primary care. Using data from the Georgia Board for Physician 
Workforce on graduate medical education [72], we estimate the input parameters of the 
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module including the percentage of graduates practicing out of Georgia and/or choosing to 
practice in other specialties than primary care. (See Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Student Module flowchart. 
The Workforce Module determines age and county of each physician currently working. 
Physicians age 35 to 64 flow through the system by transitioning between stocks 
representing 5-year age categories. We assume physicians at the age of 75 either retire or 
enter administrative roles. New physicians enter the age <35 stock after graduating and 
new graduates are allocated to each county according to the distribution of the primary care 
physicians across counties in the baseline year of 2013. The initial age distribution within 
each county is assumed to be the same as in the 2008 reports [73]. If a county does not 
have a 2008 report, we use the average of the counties belonging to the same Primary Care 
Service Area. 
To incorporate physicians’ immigration from outside Georgia, each age stock has an 
additional inflow by which providers enter the workforce according to rates computed 
using ACS data on education attainment and migration flows [42, 75]. To incorporate 
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physician attrition, each age stock has an additional outflow, again considering emigration 
patterns as well as death rates taken from tables I-7 and I-8 of [74]. 
A stock of NPs and PAs is added to the county total workforce based on data from 
previously published studies.  In particular, the growth of PAs is based on the conservative 
national growth in PAs between 2013 and 2026 projected by Hooker and Muchow [86]. 
We assume the PA growth for Georgia is the same as the national growth and a constant 
number of PAs is added each year to obtain the percentage growth between 2013 and 2025. 
A similar procedure, based on the projection of registered nurses in Georgia between 2012 
and 2025 by Health Resource and Service Administration [87], is applied to obtain the total 
number of NPs in each year. The county of each additional PA and NP is then determined 
according to the distribution of all primary care providers in the base year. 
3.2.3.2 Census Tract Distribution 
For the baseline year, physician locations are given in the NPPES data [38]. For future 
years, if a county and age class is projected to have fewer physicians than the previous 
year, we remove a randomly-selected physician in that county and age class.  
If instead an increase is projected, we distribute the projected supply surplus across 
locations using a recursive sampling approach. For each additional physician, we first 
sample a census tract within that county using a weighted sampling procedure, where 
weights are estimated using the distribution of all providers (i.e. physicians, PAs, and NPs) 
in the baseline year with a small non-zero probability given to census tracts that had no 
providers in 2013. We next assign a location within that census tract to that physician by 
sampling from all provider locations existing in the previous years. If the census tract had 
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no previous locations, we randomly select a location (latitude and longitude) in the census 
tract using information about the census tract shapefiles. 
A similar procedure is applied to distribute PAs and NPs. 
3.2.3.3 Conversion to Visits 
The census tract-level workforce estimates are converted to number of available visits 
using proficiency ratios (i.e. the average number of yearly visits per provider). Specifically, 
we use data published in [53] on Average Patient Care Hours Worked per Week by General 
Internal Medicine Physicians. Data are reported by age class and gender in full-time-
equivalent units and, by considering 45 hours per week, 50 weeks per year, and an average 
visit duration equal to 16 minutes (equivalent to a panel size of 2500 patients per year per 
physician [39] and approximately 8400 visits per year), we derived the annual number of 
visits per physician by age and gender. Using the gender distribution reported in [88] for 
which 67% of physicians are male and 33% are female, we obtain the final proficiency 
ratios for physicians (Table 9). 
Table 9. Total number of yearly visits per primary care physician, by age. 
Age Male Female Overall 
<40 8736 6888 8126 
40-44 8988 7224 8406 
45-49 9240 7644 8713 
50-54 9912 8064 9302 
55-59 9576 7896 9022 
60-64 8904 6216 8017 
> 64 7056 7560 7222 
We assume NPs and PAs all have a proficiency ratio equal to 8401, the average among the 
age classes of the proficiency ratios of primary care physicians. 
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3.2.3.4 Supply Interventions 
We run the model considering three growth scenarios to account for expected growth in 
the number of residency positions available in Georgia [89]: 0% (constant), 12% (medium) 
and 30% (high) growth in the number of enrolled graduate students.  
Provider acceptance of publicly-insured patients is estimated using the approach in [13]. 
We account for possible changes in the Medicaid participation among physicians due to 
the Medicaid Parity Program [90], by considering: Medicaid acceptance ratios increase 
only in years 2013 and 2014 (without Parity), and Medicaid participation increases for the 
entire study period (with Parity). The increment in the Medicaid acceptance ratio due to 
the Medicaid Parity Program is estimated to be 13.03% [91]. 
3.2.4 Need Projection Model 
We project need and not demand of medical care to estimate potential spatial access of 
primary care, which reflects important potential barriers to care. Demand depends on 
several factors such as income and education. For example, in the Grossman’s model [92], 
highly educated people are expected to be more efficient producers of health. Our estimates 
of need, however, are driven by demographic characteristics and health status [93, 94]. We 
use utilization data as a measure of self-assessed health status, since “self-assessments 
often provide the ‘trigger’ that leads to consultations with primary care providers” [93]. 
Need is projected for three age classes (19-24, 25-44, and 45-64), by insurance status, and 
by gender. Insured population is divided into eligible for Medicaid and with private 
insurance. Under no-ACA and non-expansion of Medicaid, only adults with children under 
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18 and a family income of less than 36% of the federal poverty level (FPL) are eligible for 
Medicaid. ACA implementation with non-expansion of Medicaid additionally makes non-
elderly people in families with income between 100 and 400 percent of FPL eligible for 
health insurance subsidizes. Under Medicaid expansion, all adults with income below 
138% of FPL are eligible for Medicaid. Figure 6 summarizes the eligibility criteria for the 
three scenarios. 
 
Figure 6. Medicaid eligibility criteria under different ACA implementation scenarios. 
Our model consists of three steps. First, the number of adults eligible for Medicaid under 
each scenario is forecasted for each census tract and year. Second, we use published 
estimates to compute the number of uninsured and privately-insured adults in each county. 
These two steps are described in detail in the following subsections. Finally, adults are 
distributed to census tracts and split into age and gender classes according to ratios 
computed from 2010 Census Table PCT3. 
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3.2.4.1 Projecting Medicaid-insured 
Regression models are used to project the total Medicaid-eligible population in Georgia in 
each county for each ACA implementation scenario. Specifically, for the baseline year, 
regression models are fit on the number of married family households with children under 
18, single parent households, and family households without children in each county using 
characteristics such as average household size, education, age, race, average rent, and 
median income. Future household estimates are produced by forecasting predictors to 
future years. Full model details are given in Appendix B.2. The predicted household counts 
are divided into income ranges to determine eligibility and converted into number of 
nonelderly adults using ratios computed from 2010 Census and 2012 ACS data.  
We assume the number of nonelderly adults in group quarters and nonfamily households 
stays proportional to the total number of nonelderly adults each year and that these adults 
do not have children. Therefore, these adults are only eligible for Medicaid under the 
Medicaid-expansion scenario. The proportion of these adults below 138% of FPL is 
assumed to be the same as the proportion of all adults within 138% of FPL given in 2012 
ACS Table B17024. 
3.2.4.2 Projecting Uninsured and Privately-insured 
For each county, we obtain the baseline percentage of non-elderly uninsured adults with 
respect to FPL using the 2013 ACS Table C27016 and the population forecasted each year 
from the Governor's Office of Planning and Budget [76].  
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For the no-ACA scenario, we assume the proportion uninsured stays equal to the 2013 
estimates each year.  
For the Medicaid expansion scenario, we assume the percent uninsured decreases over the 
years due to the effect of the individual mandate. In particular, we assume that the total 
reduction of the uninsured population in Georgia in 2022 and in the subsequent years with 
respect to the baseline no-ACA implementation scenario is equal to 51.3% as estimated by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation/Urban Institute: State-by-State implication of ACA [78]. We 
project such a reduction year-by-year by using the nationwide year-by-year change 
estimates from the Congressional Budget Office [79], shown in Figure 7. 
For the non-expansion scenario, we split the population into those under 138% of FPL and 
those over. Because adults under 138% of the FPL are eligible for a hardship exemption to 
the individual mandate if their state does not expand Medicaid, we assume for this group 
that the proportion uninsured each projected year stays equal to the 2013 census estimate. 
For adults over 138% of the FPL, we apply the reduction in uninsured that was described 
for the Medicaid expansion scenario. Note, combined with the uninsured under 138% of 
FPL, the total reduction of the uninsured population in Georgia in 2022 with respect to the 
baseline scenario is equal to 27.7%, close to the estimate of 28% by [78]. 
For each county, year, and ACA implementation scenario, we subtract our forecasted 
number of Medicaid-eligible adults and the estimated number of uninsured from the total 
nonelderly adult population forecasted by [76] to obtain the number of privately insured. 
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Figure 7. Congressional Budget Office’s yearly estimates of proportion of uninsured 
that will be covered nationwide. 
3.2.5 Optimization Model 
We apply an optimization model similar to the one described in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.3 to 
match need and supply under a series of access constraints such that the travel to care is 
optimized. 
Decision variables represent the total number of patients in each census tract of a given age 
class and gender assigned to a specific provider location, namely 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑘
𝑀  and 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑔𝑘
𝑂 , where 
index  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 represents a census tract, index  𝑗 ∈ 𝑃 represents a provider location, index  𝑘 
denotes a specific age class, index g represents the gender, and superscripts M and O 
distinguish between adults covered by Medicaid and adults covered by private insurance 
respectively. 
We assume an important factor influencing a patient’s choice in provider is distance, hence, 
patients prefer to visit nearby physicians. Thus, our objective function is the weighted sum 
of the total distance traveled which needs to be minimized: 
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where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance between the centroid of census tract 𝑖 and provider location 𝑗 and 
𝑣𝑘𝑔 are provider utilization ratios (the average number of office visits per patient)  per age 
class k and gender g, provided by [66]. 
Constraints for the model are described in Table 10 with parameter descriptions given in 
Table 11. Note, capacity 𝑠𝑗 at location 𝑗 returned by the supply projection is decreased by 
55% to account 10% visits devoted to children [36] and for 45% visits devoted to elderly 
population [95]. Also, following guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services on rational areas for the delivery of primary medical care [44], we set 
a maximum possible travel distance of 25 miles for those with a vehicle and 10 miles for 
those without. 
The output of the model consists of the optimal assignment of needed visits in each census 
tract to providers in the network, while the needed visits within a census tract may be 
assigned to different providers or/and a proportion of the need may not be served. Hence, 
the model provides estimates of the served visits for primary care. The difference between 
the needed and served visits provides the unmet need, describing patients’ ability to find 
providers who will serve them. 
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 Brief Description 






 The objective function is the minimization 








∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 
Assignment constraints that ensure total 
number of Medicaid-insured (privately-
insured) patients assigned to providers in 
each census tract does not exceed the 
total estimated Medicaid-insured 
(privately-insured) population, a 
minimum number of patients are 
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Accessibility constraints which mimic 
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Availability constraints which require 
providers to maintain a sufficiently large 
number of visits to remain in paractice 
and to stay within their overall capacity 
and capacity available for Medicaid.  
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑔(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑔
𝑀 +𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑔
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Table 11. Parameters used in the adult primary care optimization model. 
Parameters of the 
Model 
Description Value Data Source 
𝒑𝒌𝒈𝒊
𝑴  Total Medicaid-insured population in 
age class 𝑘, gender 𝑔, at census tract 𝑖. 
 Demand Projection Model 
𝒑𝒌𝒈𝒊
𝑶  Total privately--insured population in 
age class 𝑘, gender 𝑔, at census tract 𝑖. 
 Demand Projection Model 
𝒑𝒌𝒈𝒊
𝑼  Total uninsured population in age class 
𝑘, gender 𝑔, at census tract 𝑖. 
 Demand Projection Model 
𝒎𝒐𝒃𝒊
𝑴 Percentage of Medicaid-insured 
population in census tract 𝑖 that owns 
at least one vehicle 
 2010 Census and 2012 American 
Community Surveys [42]. Assumed 
constant for each year. 
𝒎𝒐𝒃𝒊
𝑶 Percentage of privately-insured 
population in census tract 𝑖 that owns 
at least one vehicle 
 2010 Census and 2012 American 
Community Surveys [42]. Assumed 
constant for each year. 
𝒎𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒙 Maximum allowed distance (in miles) 
between a patient and the matched 
provider 
25 US Department of Human and 
Health Services [44]. Assumed 
constant for each year. 
𝒎𝒐𝒃𝒎𝒂𝒙 Maximum allowed distance (in miles) 
between a patient and the matched 
provider when the patient does not 
own a vehicle 
10  
- 
𝒅𝒊𝒋 Distance between centroid of census 
tract 𝑖 and provider 𝑗 
 Assumed constant for each year. 
ArcGIS Network Analyst [45], 
2013 NPI data (for provider 
location) [38], 
2010 SF2 100% Census data (for 
centroid location) [42]. 
𝒗𝒌𝒈 Number of yearly visits of a person 
with insurance coverage in age class 𝑘 
of gender 𝑔 
 Assumed constant for each year 
[66] 
𝒄𝒎𝒊𝒏 Minimum percentage to be assigned 
providers 
 Experimentally evaluated 
𝒔𝒋 Total available visits at  provider 
location 𝑗 
 Supply projection model  
𝒍𝒄𝒋 Percentage of provider’s caseload 
necessary to remain in practice 
 Experimentally evaluated 
𝒑𝒂𝒎𝒋 Probability that providers in location 𝑗 
accept Medicaid-insured patients 
 Assumed constant for each year. 
MAX Medicaid Claims data [40].  
𝜹 Percentage of provider’s caseload 
dedicated to non-elderly population 
45% [36], [95] 
𝜹𝒄 Percentage of Medicaid provider’s 




3.2.6 Availability and Accessibility Measures 
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We use the results of the optimization model to measure spatial access to primary care for 
the adult population at the census tract level yearly. 
We measure both accessibility and availability by means of two indices that vary between 
zero (worst value) and one (best value). In particular, accessibility is measured as one 
minus the ratio between the average distance a person travels to reach his/her assigned 
provider and the maximum allowed distance according to the guidelines established by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [44]. Hence, for a given census tract, if 
the average distance a person travels for each visit is 10 miles (25 miles), the corresponding 
accessibility index for the census tract is 0.6 (0.0). Availability is measured as one minus 
the congestion (the ratio between the visits assigned to a provider and his/her maximum 
caseload) a person in the census tract experiences for each visit at his/her assigned provider. 
Hence, if the average congestion of a physician in a given census tract is equal to 80% (the 
number of visits assigned to a typical provider is 80% as large as his/her maximum 
caseload), the availability index in the census tract is equal to 0.2. We assume people who 
are not assigned to a provider have the worst spatial access, hence regions whose 
population is not assigned to any provider are assumed to experience lowest accessibility 
and availability equal to 0. 
Similar to Section 2.2.5 of Chapter 2, we identify the specific tracts where the difference 
in either accessibility, availability or served need between two given scenarios is 
statistically significant by considering the difference process 𝑍(𝑠) = 𝑀1(𝑠) − 𝑀2(𝑠) for 
each spatial unit 𝑠 (i.e., census tract) within a geographic domain (e.g. state). We consider 
multiple levels of differences to gain understanding by how large differences are, if they 
exist. The difference thus takes three different levels, i.e., δ=0.0, δ=0.05, or δ=0.1. We 
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again create significance maps, where points correspond to the centroids of the census 
tracts where the difference process Z(s) is significantly negative or positive. With each map 
is an associated table containing the number of locations where the difference process is 
statistically significantly positive, negative and of no change. A significance level of 0.05 
is used. 
3.3 Results 
Results are obtained for 13 possible different scenarios Table 12 of different 
implementations of Medicaid eligibility expansion (no-ACA, non-expansion, expansion), 
different supply growth rates (constant, medium, high), and different Medicaid acceptance 
ratios (without Parity, with Parity). The baseline scenario corresponds to no-ACA, constant 
supply growth and without Parity. 
Table 12. Different policy scenarios considered. 
  
Medicaid Parity WITHOUT Expansion 
(without Parity) 





















1 (baseline) - - - - - 
ACA Non-
expansion 
2 3 4 8 9 10 
ACA with 
Expansion 
5 6 7 11 12 13 
 
3.3.1 Supply-Projection Model 
Between 2013 and 2025, the number of primary care physicians increases by 9.2% (615 
total) under the constant growth, by 10.1% (677 total) under the medium growth, and by 
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11.7% (784 total) under the high growth scenarios. The number of NPs is projected to 
increase by 20%, while the number of PAs by 47%. 
3.3.2 Need-Projection Model 
Under Medicaid expansion, additional 980,000 people are projected to be eligible for the 
Medicaid program by 2025, and a decrease of over 700,000 uninsured is projected. In 2013, 
the percentage of Medicaid-eligible adult population is estimated to be 2%, while under 
the expansion scenario in 2025, it is projected to be 17% of the total population. The 
percentage of uninsured is estimated to be 26% of the total population in 2013 and 15% in 
2025 under expansion. Population aging and growth are projected to produce an increase 
in the needed visits by 20% by 2025. 
3.3.3 Optimization Model 
Figure 8 shows the number of served visits in the state for all the projected years 
considering different scenarios. In 2025, the number of served visits under the baseline 
scenario is 7,044,866; an additional 876,124 visits are served due to the exchange market, 
a negligible number of additional visits are served due to supply growth and/or 
implementation of the parity program, while an additional 439,087 visits are served under 
Medicaid eligibility expansion. In the baseline scenario in 2013, the served visits are 67% 
of the needed visits and they remain the same in 2025 both for the baseline scenario and 




Figure 8. Total served visits in the state for all projected years and for different 
scenarios. 
Table 13 shows the impact of the ACA provisions with and without Medicaid expansion 
on the served visits in year 2025 for the entire population. The impact of ACA under non-
expansion is measured as the difference between the percentage of served visits under the 
non-expansion and no-ACA scenarios without additional supply growth or the Parity 
program (scenario 2 and scenario 1 in Table 12). The impact of Medicaid eligibility 
expansion is measured as the difference in the percentage of served visits under the 
expansion and non-expansion scenarios (scenario 5 and scenario 2 in Table 12). In year 
2025 with =0.0, almost all the census tracts have a statistically significantly increment in 
the served visit for the entire population due to the provisions of ACA both with and 
without Medicaid expansion. For   0.1 the difference is not statistically significant. The 
significance maps for =0.0 are given in Figure 9, where it is shown that the positive impact 




































Table 13. Number census tracts where the difference in the percentage of served visits 
is significantly positive, negative, or with no change, for three levels of the difference 
for the entire population in 2025.  
  
Change 
Difference in the percentage of served visits 
=0% =5% =10% 
Imapct of ACA 
under Non-
expansion 
Positive 1954 1472 0 
Negative 0 0 0 




Positive 1955 0 0 
Negative 0 0 0 
No Change 0 1955 1955 
 










Figure 9. Significance maps marking census tracts where the difference in percentage 
of served visits in 2025 is significantly positive or significantly negative. Grey-shaded 
counties were not found to have a significant difference. 
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3.3.4 Availability and Accessibility Measures 
3.3.4.1 Accessibility 
In the baseline scenario in 2013, the median accessibility is 0.674 for the overall 
population, 0.919 for the publicly-insured, and 0.925 for the privately-insured.  
In year 2025 under non-expansion, assuming medium supply growth with parity, median 
accessibility is 0.760 for overall population, 0.921 for publicly insured, and 0.926 for 
privately insured. Under expansion, median accessibility is 0.811 for overall population, 
0.922 for publicly insured, and 0.925 for privately insured. Figure 10 shows the median 
level of accessibility at the state level for all the projected years considering different 
scenarios. 
The impact on accessibility of ACA under non-expansion is measured as the difference 
between the level of accessibility under the non-expansion and no-ACA scenarios. In 2025, 
the impact regardless of the implementation of the Parity program ranges between -0.2 and 
0.5, where positive values correspond to an improvement in accessibility under non-
expansion. For =0.0, assuming medium supply growth, the majority of census tracts show 
a statistically significantly positive difference regardless of the implementation of the 
Parity program. Such a difference is not statistically significant for  0.1 (see Table 14). 
The corresponding significance maps for =0.0 show that the positive impact is not 
concentrated in specific areas but affects the entire state uniformly. 
The measure of the impact of Medicaid eligibility expansion is measured as the difference 
in the level of accessibility under the expansion and non-expansion scenarios. In 2025, 
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assuming medium supply growth with parity, impact ranges between -0.095 and 0.095 for 
the publicly-insured for 95% of the census tracts, and between -0.06 and 0.06 for the 
privately-insured, where positive values correspond to an improvement in accessibility 
under expansion. For =0.0, the number of census tracts where the difference is statistically 
significantly positive (negative) is 82 (61) for the publicly-insured population and 79 (156) 
for the privately-insured population. For   0.05 the difference is not statistically 
significant (Table 15). The significance maps for =0.0 show both the positive and negative 
impact are concentrated mainly in urban areas, namely, the Atlanta and Columbus areas. 
Table 14. Number census tracts where the difference between the non-expansion with 
medium supply growth and the baseline scenarios is significantly positive, negative, 





0% 5% 10% 0% 5% 10% 
No 
Positive 1934 1209 0 579 0 0 
Negative 0 0 0 109 0 0 
No Change 21 746 1955 1267 1955 1955 
Yes 
Positive 1935 1212 0 538 0 0 
Negative 0 0 0 104 0 0 
No Change 20 743 1955 1313 1955 1955 
 
Table 15. Number census tracts where the difference between the expansion and non-
expansion scenarios, assuming medium supply growth, is significantly positive, 






Publicly-insured Privately-insured Publicly-insured Privately-insured 
0% 5% 10% 0% 5% 10% 0% 5% 10% 0% 5% 10% 
No 
Positive 88 0 0 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Negative 171 0 0 81 0 0 1820 0 0 1955 0 0 
No Change 1696 1955 1955 1789 1955 1955 135 1955 1955 0 1955 1955 
Yes 
Positive 82 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Negative 61 0 0 156 0 0 1955 1015 0 1955 0 0 





Figure 10. Median accessibility (top) and median availability (bottom) at the state 
level for the entire population for all the projected years and for different scenarios. 
3.3.4.2 Availability 
In the baseline scenario in 2013, median availability is 0.202 for the overall population, 
0.418 for the publicly-insured, and 0.271 for the privately-insured. 
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In 2025 under non-expansion, assuming medium supply growth with parity, median 
availability is 0.196 for the overall population, 0.348 for the publicly-insured, and 0.234 
for the privately-insured. Under expansion, median availability is 0.182 for the overall 
population, 0.251 for the publicly-insured, and 0.196 for the privately-insured. Figure 10 
shows the median level of availability at the state level for all the projected years 
considering different scenarios. 
In year 2025, assuming medium supply growth, the impact on availability of ACA non-
expansion, regardless the implementation of the Parity program, ranges between -0.3 and 
0.5, where positive values correspond to an improvement in availability under non-
expansion. For =0.0, the number of census tracts where the difference is statistically 
significantly positive (negative) is 579 (109) without Parity and 538 (104) with Parity. For 
  0.05 the difference is not statistically significant (see Table 14). 
The impact on availability of Medicaid eligibility expansion, assuming medium supply 
growth with parity, ranges between -0.48 and 0.48 for the publicly-insured for 95% of the 
census tracts and between -0.28 and 0.28 for the privately-insured, where positive values 
correspond to an improvement in availability under expansion. For =0.0, the majority of 
the census tracts show a statistically significantly negative difference for both the 
population groups regardless of the implementation of the Parity program. For   0.1 the 
difference is not statistically significant (Table 15). 
3.4 Discussion 
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This chapter focuses on the projected impact of ACA implementation on spatial access to 
primary care for non-elderly population at the census tract level and over time for Georgia.  
Existing studies project supply either for the entire workforce [67, 96, 97] or by 
specialization [94, 98-103] commonly at the national level. This paper is the first to report 
primary care supply projections by age and at the census tract level.  
In contrast to existing research [53, 66, 104], we evaluate the impact of ACA (with or 
without Medicaid expansion) on healthcare access using served need estimated using an 
optimization model. This is an important contribution as it should be expected that not all 
supply will be available to patients in need of care due to healthcare access barriers and 
system constraints. 
The percentage of unmet needed visits decreases to 25% under non-expansion and to 20% 
under expansion, both for medium and high supply growth. These results are not consistent 
with existing studies, which forecast that the supply shortage worsens with the 
implementation of the ACA [53, 66, 104]. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that 
our shortage measure accounts for system interactions between supply and need, unlike 
commonly used measures [53, 64, 66]. Additionally, these findings reveal the importance 
of interventions to increase supply in targeted areas so that accessibility and availability 
barriers can be overcome where needed. 
Overall, the implementation of the ACA will have a positive impact on accessibility 
(increase up to 20% under expansion), while it will negatively affect availability (decrease 
between 13% and 19% under expansion). This finding reveals the importance of 
implementing interventions accounting for multiple dimensions of access simultaneously. 
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However, the overall impact on spatial access will minimally affect the geographic 
disparities in the state. We find that few communities, particularly those with predominant 
uninsured population, experience improved accessibility, and few communities experience 
reduced accessibility due to the added need. We also project that the ACA provisions 
excluding Medicaid expansion will minimally affect availability, although the number of 
communities with projected lower availability is larger than the number of communities 
with projected lower accessibility.  
More importantly, under Medicaid expansion, the burden on the privately insured 
population in terms of accessibility of primary care is not substantial. There are very few 
communities where privately insured will experience lower accessibility of primary care 
services. The availability of primary care providers for both the populations will decrease 
in most communities. Such a decrement, however, is not greater than 0.05.  
One primary challenge in this study is the limited data availability. We consider multiple 
data sources for different years when estimating the model parameters. A second limitation 
is the reliance on several model assumptions. The supply model assumes that provider 
productivity and its geographic distribution remain the same as in the baseline year. The 
supply of midlevel providers is underestimated because such providers are not captured in 
NPESS if they do not directly bill for services; the practice act in Georgia requires midlevel 
providers to practice under the supervision of a physician [105]. The projection of midlevel 
providers may also be underestimated as the supervision requirements may be removed. 
The need projection model assumes that current patterns of healthcare utilization remain 
the same as in the baseline year. While the need estimates are based on utilization ratios 
which may underestimate or overestimate need for some subpopulations, other approaches 
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such as using the recommended care guidelines could consistently underestimate the need 
across most populations, particularly for those with chronic conditions. In the optimization 
model, the willingness to travel is assumed the same for all populations in rural and urban 
areas. The models introduced in this paper are general in that they allow such assumptions 
to be relaxed if detailed local-level data are available to inform the system constraints. 
Additionally, our models account for changes in supply and need due to some provisions 
of the ACA (i.e., Medicaid eligibility expansion, the creation of the exchange insurance 
market, supply growth, and Medicaid Parity program), but they do not account other major 
changes in policy such as new payment models or technology oriented health care 
provisions as it is still unclear how such changes will impact supply. These can be 
addressed using our models along with simulation approaches, which can generate 
behavioral responses to such changes.  
Even though this study has several limitations, it has some important implications for 
health care providers and policy makers. While there are several national-level studies 
highlighting the need of primary care providers for supplying the increased need due to 
ACA provisions [53, 63-64, 66], we find that such provisions (i.e. Medicaid eligibility 
expansion and health exchange markets) will reduce the total unmet need and positively 
impact accessibility for the overall population while reducing availability.  
With respect to accessibility, the burden of the increased need due to a higher Medicaid 
population is not significant on the privately-insured population, while potentially reducing 
the availability of primary care providers for the publicly-insured and the privately-insured 
population.  
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If Georgia opts for Medicaid eligibility expansion the total level of served need will 
substantially increase (from 67% to 80%) in 2025. Such a policy will positively affect the 
total level of accessibility for the overall population, while reducing availability. Increase 
of supply will also positively affect the served need and the accessibility but will not 
uniformly overcome spatial access barriers. For a more effective impact, interventions need 
to be targeted locally accounting simultaneously for multiple dimensions of access. 
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CHAPTER 4. PROVIDER-LEVEL CASELOAD OF 
PSYCHOSOCIAL SERVICES FOR MEDICAID-INSURED 
CHILDREN 
4.1 Introduction 
Mental health (MH) disorders are prevalent among children but undertreated, with less than 
half of those with mental health disorders receiving any services [106]. For the most 
common disorders among this population, including depression, anxiety disorder, and 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, psychotherapy and/or other psychosocial services 
are recommended as a first line of treatment [107-110]. Guidelines by the National Institute 
of Mental Health specify that children with mental health and behavioral disorders should 
all receive psychotherapeutic or psychosocial intervention, and that psychotropic 
medication should be complemented by provision of these services [111]. Several studies 
examined the efficacy of various psychosocial interventions [112-115]. About 75% of 
people who undergo psychotherapy show improvement for their condition [116]. 
Medicaid is the largest insurer of children [117] and the single largest payer of mental 
health services [118], but studies have documented that many Medicaid-insured children 
with mental health and behavioral disorders do not receive any psychosocial treatment 
[119-124]. Only 49% of young persons aged ≤20 years received psychosocial services 
before starting antipsychotics [125], and only 68% of children and adolescents aged 6-17 
years received concurrent therapy [123]. Fewer than 38% of children aged 6-12 years who 
initiated medication for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder received any psychotherapy 
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visits [119]. Among children who initiate treatment, many do not receive a minimal number 
of psychotherapy [124, 126] or psychosocial [127, 128] visits. 
Several studies have posited that lack of geographic access to treatment is one of the major 
barriers to psychotherapy services for this population. Not only is there an overall shortage 
of mental health providers in most states [129], but many mental health providers do not 
accept Medicaid [129-131].  A national survey of office-based psychiatrists found that the 
percentage of psychiatrists who accept Medicaid declined from 2010 to 2015, and only 
35.4% accepted new Medicaid patients during the most recent period examined (2014-
2015) [131]. Studies have also examined the geographic availability of mental health 
treatment facilities that accept Medicaid [132, 133] and/or serve children [134]. Those 
studies reported that many communities lack these resources. 
 Although some studies have provided information about geographic availability and 
distribution of Medicaid-participating providers [132-134], these studies did not describe 
the volume of services provided at each location. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a small 
percentage of mental health treatment facilities and clinics may provide the majority of 
services to this population (i.e., high-volume providers). These studies also focused on 
specialty mental health providers; however, psychosocial services can also be delivered in 
other settings such as primary care practices [135-138]. To date, empirical data are lacking 
on how the supply of psychosocial services for Medicaid-enrolled children varies across 
provider types (e.g., primary care, mental health specialists). A nuanced understanding has 
important implications for informing the accessibility of services for Medicaid-enrolled 
children. 
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This chapter links two large national databases to conduct the most comprehensive analysis 
to date on the supply of psychotherapy services available to Medicaid-insured children. 
Our objectives were to provide new information about who delivers psychosocial services 
to Medicaid-enrolled children and how visit volume is distributed across provider types 
and geography. Material in this chapter has been published in final form at [139]. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
We used data from the 2013 National Plan and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES) 
database [38] and 2012-2013 Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) claims [40]. NPPES is a 
national database listing all health care providers with a National Provider Identifier (NPI) 
number. An NPI number can be assigned to a person (entity type 1) or an organization, 
such as a hospital or physician group (entity type 2). We used NPPES to determine whether 
a provider seeing Medicaid-insured children for psychosocial services specializes in a 
mental health–related field, as defined by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration [140], or another field, such as primary care, rehabilitative care, or 
developmental care. We considered providers who fell into one of the following 11 
provider categories: psychiatrist, psychologist, counselor, social worker, mental health 
center, other entity 1 mental health, other entity 2 mental health, primary care, 
rehabilitative/developmental care, other care center (including general acute-care hospitals 
and federally qualified health centers), and other entity 2 related care. A full description of 
taxonomies in each category is available in Appendix C. We included psychiatric hospitals 
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and residential treatment facilities in the category of mental health center because they can 
have outpatient clients [141].  
For the MAX data, the most recent years of data available from CMS when this study began 
were 2013 for 28 states and 2012 for all states. We used information from the MAX 
Personal Summary file, which contains demographic data for Medicaid beneficiaries, and 
the MAX Other Therapy file, which contains claims for services received by Medicaid 
beneficiaries outside of inpatient hospitals, long-term care facilities, and pharmacies. We 
used Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes [142] to identify health care encounters 
involving psychotherapy (including individual, group, or family psychotherapy) or other 
psychosocial services, such as skills training and development, psychosocial rehabilitation 
services, and activity therapy. The selected CPT codes are level 1 Healthcare Common 
Procedure Coding System codes that are based on codes used in a Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention study [143]. The Georgia Institute of Technology Institutional 
Review Board approved this study. 
4.2.2 Linking NPPES Provider Database to MAX Claims 
We developed an algorithm to link providers in the NPPES Provider database with the 
healthcare encounter data from the MAX OT file. The MAX OT file contains two separate 
identifiers for the billing provider (the NPI number as well as a unique Medicaid 
identification number) and one identifier for the service provider (a unique Medicaid 
identification number). We assumed that the Medicaid beneficiary received services from 
the provider listed in the “service provider” field, which can differ from the “billing 
provider”. For example, individual providers may work for a subsidiary organization but 
 66 
bill under the NPI number of a parent organization. Because the “service provider” field in 
the MAX data only contain the unique Medicaid identification number, we created an 
algorithm to match an NPI number to the service provider field using information from the 
billing provider fields. This algorithm is summarized in Figure 11 and described below. 
 
 
Figure 11. Procedure to match service providers to NPIs. 
 
In Step 1, if a service provider ever appeared as a billing provider in the MAX OT file, we 
assessed whether all claims for which he or she was listed as the billing provider had the 
same NPI. In this case, we considered that NPI be a ‘match’. This accounted for 33% of all 
matches for psychosocial service providers.  If the service provider was not matched, in 
step 2 we assessed whether the billing NPI field was valid and identical in all claims in 
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which he or she was listed as the service provider. If so, we considered that to be the 
matched NPI (42% of all matches).  Service providers matched in these two steps were 
considered to have a single NPI match. 
For service providers with multiple valid NPIs in the billing NPI field, we randomly 
selected a billing NPI with a MH-related primary taxonomy from the claims in which they 
were the billing provider if those claims had any such primary taxonomies (3.4% of all 
matches). If not, we randomly selected a billing NPI with a MH-related primary taxonomy 
from the claims in which they were the service provider (5.4% of all matches).  Remaining 
service providers were either matched to a random non-MH-related billing NPI (4.0% of 
all matches) or had no associated billing NPIs that were listed in the NPPES database (12% 
of all matches). 
In our analysis, we included 21 states from 2013 and 13 additional states from 2012 (34 
states total) for which we could match at least 75% of psychosocial service providers to a 
single NPI number in the NPPES database. States for which we could match <75% of 
psychosocial service providers to a single NPI number in the NPPES database either had a 
large number of service providers, each with multiple potential NPI numbers (e.g., Indiana, 
Nebraska, Wyoming), or had a large number of billing NPI numbers not listed in the 
NPPES database and, therefore, service providers could not be matched to any NPI number 
(e.g., Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire). 
4.2.3 Address Classification 
To avoid a provider’s caseload being split between his or her own Entity 1 NPI number 
and his or her organization’s Entity 2 NPI number, we additionally grouped providers with 
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the same practice address together and performed an address-level analysis. That is, for 
each address where at least 1 Medicaid psychosocial service provider practices, we took 
the following 3 steps: (1) we identified all providers in the 2013 NPPES database sharing 
that practice address, (2) we determined the provider category of each of those providers 
using their Entity type and primary taxonomy, and (3) we categorized the practice setting 
of the address. We performed these steps in a hierarchical fashion based on the presence or 
absence of each provider category. For example, the presence of a mental health center 
provider resulted in a “mental health practice setting” categorization, whereas the presence 
of an other care center provider and absence of a mental health center provider resulted in 
an “other care center practice setting” categorization. Remaining categories are shown in 
Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Classification of addresses. White boxes list each possible address 
categorization. Each address is categorized based on whether the description of 
providers located at that address given in the blue boxes applies, starting with the box 
furthest left. 
4.2.4 Caseload Estimation 
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We measured the caseload of each Medicaid-participating provider delivering 
psychosocial services by estimating the number of Medicaid-enrolled children who 
received psychosocial services from that provider in a given year and adding all the 
psychosocial visits delivered by that provider. We obtained the unique address-level 
caseloads by combining the caseloads of all service providers practicing at the same 
address. 
We examined state-level variations in the distribution of services across provider and 
location categories, and by practice location urbanicity. We determined urbanicity by using 
the zip code approximation of the rural–urban commuting area codes [144]: codes 1-3 
represented large urban areas (i.e., areas with a primary flow to or within an urbanized 
area), codes 4-6 represented small urban areas (i.e., areas with a primary flow to or within 
a large urban cluster), and codes 7-10 represented rural areas. 
4.3 Results 
In the 34 states (21 states from 2013 and 13 states from 2012), we identified 83,727 mental 
health providers who provided psychosocial services to Medicaid-insured enrollees. Of 
these, 51,638 (61.7%) provided psychosocial services to Medicaid-insured children. We 
additionally identified 18,721 practitioners in related health care settings who provided 
psychosocial services to Medicaid-insured persons, 11,676 (62.4%) of whom served 
children. Combined, these providers saw more than 1.6 million Medicaid-insured children 
and provided more than 32 million psychosocial services visits to these children across 32 
238 provider locations. Of these children, 60% were aged <13 years and 91% had a mental 
health diagnosis. 
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Mental health practitioners conducted more psychosocial treatments than non–mental 
health practitioners (Figure 13). More than one-third of children were treated at mental 
health centers, which accounted for >40% of mental health visits. Counselors, the largest 
group of the 11 provider types, treated 20% of children and accounted for 16% of mental 
health visits. Other care centers treated 16% of children and accounted for 15% of mental 
health visits. 
More than 58% of psychosocial services occurred at addresses with at least 1 mental health 
center. Additionally, about 21% of children were treated and 19% of visits took place at 
other care center locations. Only about 12% of children were treated at locations with 
Entity 1 mental health providers but no organization NPI number. These locations were 





Figure 13. Total number of Medicaid-insured children seen for psychosocial services 
and their corresponding total number of psychosocial visits aggregated among 34 US 
states in 1 selected year (2012 or 2013), by provider category. 
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4.3.1 State-level Distribution of Services 
The distribution of psychosocial services across provider and address categories varied 
considerably by state. The percentage of children who received psychosocial services from 
mental health centers ranged from 2.4% (Washington) to 81.7% (Kentucky), whereas the 
percentage of psychosocial service visits from mental health centers ranged from 1.2% 
(Iowa) to 86.8% (Kentucky). In Oklahoma and Texas, counselors treated the majority of 
children, whereas in Minnesota, psychologists treated the majority of children. In 3 states 
(Iowa, Illinois, and Washington), more children were treated by non–mental health 
providers than by mental health providers. 
Aggregating services by location revealed that in more than half of the states, most services 
occurred at mental health center locations (Table 16, Table 17). However, large variations 
occurred. The percentage of children seeking psychosocial services at mental health center 
locations (vs other locations) ranged from 7.8% (Washington) to 88.6% (Kentucky). In 
Illinois, Iowa, Montana, and Washington, most children (54.5% to 87.2%) were treated in 
other care center locations. Only in Vermont were more than 50% of children seen at 
locations with Entity 1 mental health providers but no Entity 2 providers; however, only 
28.2% of visits by children were made at those locations. 
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Table 16. Distribution of Medicaid-insured child psychosocial patients across address 




% of Patients 
MHC OCC MHE2 CMH MMH SMH PDE2 PDE1 
Alabama* 35,040 65.9 20.5 11.2 1.1 3.4 8.2 0.3 0.1 
Arizona 56,045 77.0 22.9 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.02 
Connecticut 29,903 51.4 36.2 12.2 7.2 5.5 6.7 0.1 0.3 
District of Columbia* 5,868 58.4 41.8 7.3 0 0.3 0.9 0 0 
Florida* 80,695 47.0 20.5 12.6 4.4 11.7 14.6 2.5 4.6 
Georgia 67,249 55.5 10.9 27.8 1.5 6.2 8.5 1.1 1.4 
Hawaii 1,551 56.0 44.7 0 0.7 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 5,667 17.5 81.5 1.7 0.4 0 0 3.2 0.3 
Idaho 18,394 61.6 28.5 22.1 1.5 1.7 1.0 0.7 0 
Illinois* 115,650 29.6 70.5 1.8 0.7 0.8 2.3 0.5 5.6 
Kentucky* 50,774 88.6 4.5 6.2 1.7 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Louisiana 39,574 68.7 17.6 8.1 3.2 4.0 6.0 0.2 0.7 
Massachusetts 87,878 75.0 20.5 6.2 3.1 2.5 1.8 0.1 0.0 
Maryland* 39,829 65.7 23.0 8.5 1.3 3.5 6.6 0.1 0 
Minnesota 35,874 47.0 25.1 34.2 0.2 7.0 1.6 0.3 0.2 
Mississippi 32,157 63.2 13.1 17.4 3.9 3.9 10.9 0 0 
Montana* 10,465 25.5 54.5 18.1 2.5 12.1 11.2 0.6 1.3 
North Carolina* 78,468 42.0 16.8 24.1 6.0 5.6 19.3 2.7 1.0 
New Jersey 31,482 73.8 13.8 16.8 0.7 0.8 3.3 0.1 0 
New Mexico* 37,938 45.4 36.2 25.0 0.9 3.3 6.5 0.9 1.0 
Nevada* 10,025 85.5 12.8 24.7 6.7 16.1 21.5 1.5 27.7 
New York 61,925 31.9 14.4 10.0 35.2 11.5 10.9 0.5 0.6 
Ohio 122,127 80.2 10.6 12.7 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.1 
Oklahoma 98,125 52.7 7.4 31.5 2.5 10.3 23.5 0.0 0.8 
Oregon 22,438 62.4 18.3 20.0 1.8 7.9 3.3 0.1 0 
Pennsylvania 110,304 76.9 15.5 9.2 0.6 2.1 2.2 0.5 0.1 
Tennessee 43,134 59.0 12.0 10.9 10.0 10.2 9.6 0.2 0.5 
Texas* 145,564 26.9 30.1 24.7 5.7 11.4 18.6 0.2 0.2 
Utah 13,963 49.1 6.0 43.2 0.9 11.6 6.5 0 0.2 
Virginia* 35,166 47.0 20.3 29.0 4.2 9.2 9.1 0.4 0.1 
Vermont 10,530 42.0 7.7 21.2 7.3 29.6 21.0 0 0 
Washington 50,662 7.8 87.2 4.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 0.3 0.7 
Wisconsin* 34,200 45.3 23.2 18.1 12.4 10.2 7.0 0.5 0.9 




Table 17. Distribution of Medicaid-insured child psychosocial visits across address 




% of Visits 
MHC OCC MHE2 CMH MMH SMH PDE2 PDE1 
Alabama* 840,858 80.3 13.0 3.0 0.1 0.8 2.7 0.1 0.03 
Arizona 745,061 84.2 13.1 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.02 0.01 
Connecticut 517,747 40.1 34.7 8.4 6.2 4.0 6.4 0.1 0.1 
District of Columbia* 138,044 69.8 18.8 11.0 0 0.1 0.3 0 0 
Florida* 1,030,037 45.6 15.0 9.2 2.8 8.9 11.5 1.6 5.4 
Georgia 1,186,922 73.5 5.2 13.5 0.7 2.1 3.5 0.8 0.8 
Hawaii 32,971 83.9 16.0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 368,572 3.82 95.7 0.1 0.04 0 0 0.3 0.03 
Idaho 878,843 45.7 43.7 10.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 
Illinois* 1,706,700 33.7 56.0 0.9 0.2 0.3 2.1 0.4 6.5 
Kentucky* 513,478 91.0 2.9 3.9 0.6 1.5 0.04 0.1 0.04 
Louisiana 1,076,208 84.4 4.7 7.2 1.0 0.8 1.7 0.1 0.1 
Massachusetts 2,635,936 80.0 11.9 4.7 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.02 0.01 
Maryland* 762,003 64.9 18.8 7.1 0.9 2.1 6.0 0.3 0 
Minnesota 778,272 47.5 16.9 28.3 0.04 6.1 1.0 0.2 0.1 
Mississippi 821,511 61.6 9.1 17.4 1.4 2.1 8.5 0 0 
Montana* 467,083 16.2 70.4 4.9 0.6 3.3 3.9 0.2 0.5 
North Carolina* 1,745,610 45.6 24.5 11.7 2.2 2.1 11.1 2.4 0.4 
New Jersey 466,525 63.6 14.5 18.5 0.2 0.5 2.7 0.01 0 
New Mexico* 940,717 50.0 29.6 13.8 0.5 1.3 3.4 0.8 0.6 
Nevada* 620,908 54.2 3.0 8.1 2.5 6.1 8.2 0.7 17.3 
New York 571,711 27.8 10.3 11.2 31.7 9.9 8.7 0.2 0.3 
Ohio 2,571,918 87.2 3.5 8.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.03 
Oklahoma 3,224,014 46.4 2.8 25.7 1.5 6.5 16.7 0.02 0.4 
Oregon 249,955 61.6 12.8 16.2 0.8 6.4 2.4 0.04 0 
Pennsylvania 2,987,005 77.5 12.8 6.7 0.5 1.3 1.2 0.03 0.01 
Tennessee 368,921 61.5 10.9 6.8 5.8 6.8 7.6 0.1 0.6 
Texas* 1,377,028 25.4 22.7 18.7 4.8 8.5 19.8 0.1 0.2 
Utah 396,217 44.7 8.6 40.6 0.2 3.8 2.2 0 0.02 
Virginia* 531,231 51.8 12.6 18.7 2.4 5.7 8.5 0.3 0.01 
Vermont 342,033 42.1 2.5 24.9 2.3 18.1 10.1 0 0 
Washington 752,035 8.4 84.2 3.2 1.6 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.6 
Wisconsin* 351,274 49.1 14.0 14.7 8.8 6.4 6.3 0.3 0.4 




4.3.2 Per-provider Distribution 
Most providers saw <25 children and provided <250 psychosocial service visits during 
their selected year of data (Table 18, Figure 14). More than 75% of Entity 1 mental health 
providers saw at most 20 Medicaid-enrolled children per year or provided <170 
psychosocial visits to Medicaid-enrolled children. Among Entity 1 mental health providers, 
counselors had the highest 75th-percentile child–patient caseload, with 25 children, and the 
highest 75th-percentile and 90th-percentile child–visit caseloads, with 302 and 730 visits, 
respectively. However, psychiatrists had the highest 90th-percentile child–patient 
caseload, with 84 children. Social workers generally had the lowest caseloads. 
Table 18. Total number of addresses seeing Medicaid-insured children for 
psychosocial services (no.) and mean (mean), 50th percentile (50%), 75th percentile 
(75%), and 90th percentile (90%) caseload among those addresses, by zip code 
urbanicity and address category. Blank cells indicate a caseload below 11. 
  
Patients Visits 
MHC OCC MHE2 CMH MMH SMH PDE2 PDE1 MHC OCC MHE2 CMH MMH SMH PDE2 PDE1 
Overall 
No. 7092 7071 4236 1391 2944 7247 648 1609 7092 7071 4236 1391 2944 7247 648 1609 
Mean 140 53 57 36 34 20 15 12 2629 762 695 327 352 257 161 186 
50% 30 — 15 — — — — — 296 66 103 48 76 64 — 59 
75% 108 35 47 30 34 22 — 14 1571 381 401 204 297 256 54 235 
90% 331 109 124 77 78 47 32 30 5820 1423 1165 596 785 680 402 495 
Large 
urban 
No. 5661 5396 3582 1183 2377 5749 504 1402 5661 5396 3582 1183 2377 5749 504 1402 
Mean 146 61 56 35 32 20 15 12 2742 821 681 317 316 258 144 188 
50% 29 — 14 — — — — — 285 66 93 43 62 60 — 63 
75% 109 39 44 27 30 20 — 15 1561 381 381 182 252 233 52 236 
90% 348 130 120 69 71 46 31 30 6296 1473 1162 549 697 663 435 487 
Small 
urban 
No. 859 795 431 143 336 793 96 132 859 795 431 143 336 793 96 132 
Mean 149 38 64 47 43 21 18 — 2744 702 678 428 481 264 266 179 
50% 41 — 23 14 18 11 — — 420 64 164 80 170 88 16 31 
75% 132 35 66 53 50 27 13 13 1971 410 511 377 490 363 77 245 
90% 334 85 153 117 110 50 47 26 5802 1529 1121 889 1109 759 276 495 
Rural 
No. 555 866 220 63 224 683 48 72 555 866 220 63 224 683 48 72 
Mean 70 22 51 26 39 19 — 12 1310 449 927 294 540 239 127 173 
50% 28 — 19 — 22 — — — 225 73 169 78 167 87 — 30 
75% 73 20 51 32 48 25 — 15 1131 347 584 173 500 310 30 200 
90% 157 56 122 59 96 45 25 28 3050 1120 1327 601 1174 691 245 527 
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Child Patients per Provider Child Visits per Provider 
  
Child Patients per Address Child Visits per Address 
  
Figure 14. Boxplots displaying per-provider per-year and per-address per-year 
caseloads of Medicaid-insured child psychosocial patients and visits across 34 US 
states, by provider and address category. 
Across address categorizations, median caseload was at most 30 children and 296 visits. 
Mental health centers had the highest mean, median, 75th percentile caseload, and 90th 
percentile caseload, both in patients and visits, which was at least twice those of the next 
highest category (generally locations with other Entity 2 mental health). Caseload was 
generally lowest at locations without mental health providers. All these caseload 
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distributions were heavily skewed (Figure 14). For example, about 7% of locations with 
Entity 1 mental health providers but without Entity 2 mental health providers saw half of 
the Medicaid-enrolled children seeking psychosocial services from such locations. 
Similarly, 4% of mental health centers saw half the children seeking psychosocial services 
at mental health center locations. 
Patient caseloads for Entity 1 mental health providers were generally lowest in large urban 
zip codes and highest in small urban areas (75th percentile of 18 children in large urban 
areas vs 29 children in small urban areas). Entity 1 mental health provider visit caseloads, 
however, were highest in rural zip codes (75th percentile of 144 visits from children in 
large urban areas versus 312 visits from children in rural areas). Small urban zip codes 
generally had the highest patient caseload across all address categories and the highest 
child visit caseloads for mental health center, other care center, and single mental health 
provider locations. Rural zip codes had the lowest patient and visit caseloads for both 
mental health centers and other care centers (Table 18).  
4.4 Discussion 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the current supply of psychosocial 
services available for Medicaid-enrolled children across provider types, revealing the 
important role of mental health centers, especially those that serve a high volume of 
Medicaid-enrolled children. More than half of the visits occurred in a mental health center, 
yet only 4% of mental health centers saw half the children seeking psychosocial services. 
Across all practice settings, fewer than 10% of locations were responsible for more than 
half of the patients served and more than half of the visits provided. This finding suggests 
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that Medicaid-insured children have little choice in treatment location. Concentrating the 
supply of psychosocial services to few locations may partly explain why many studies cite 
distance as a barrier to care [145-147]. These findings underscore the limits of studies that 
assess geographic accessibility of mental health treatment by only examining where mental 
health clinics and providers are located, without taking into account the volume of services 
provided at those location.  
Fewer than 15% of patients who seek psychosocial services receive these services from 
providers not associated with a center or organization. This concentration of treatment at 
centers and organizations may be due to barriers against Medicaid participation among 
providers, such as reimbursement rates and administrative costs. Administrative 
requirements and the cost of overhead to handle paperwork and insurance billing have been 
reported as a barrier to psychiatrists participating in Medicaid [148, 149]. This barrier may 
be even more pronounced for therapists in solo or small group practices. Easing these 
burdens may enable providers to accept more Medicaid-insured patients. 
Service distribution is not consistent across states, which may be explained, in part, by 
differences in the organization of mental health care systems available to serve Medicaid-
insured children and/or differences in state policies. For example, Florida required 
behavioral health clinicians such as psychologists to work under physician supervision, 
which may explain why it has more services provided by psychiatrists and related care 
providers than most other states [150]. In Massachusetts, private practice psychologists can 
only provide therapy through licensed mental health clinics, which may account for its low 
rate of services from Entity 1 providers [151]. 
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Our findings have key implications for policy makers and program planners who aim to 
improve the accessibility of psychosocial services for Medicaid-enrolled children. These 
decision makers should recognize that high-volume mental health clinics play an important 
role in providing psychosocial services to Medicaid-insured children. Policy makers can 
provide incentives and resources to encourage increased geographic accessibility of 
services provided by high-volume clinics. One approach would be for these facilities to 
partner with schools to deliver psychosocial services on school grounds [152-153]. Another 
approach would be to incentivize these clinics to provide home-based services, in which 
counselors or therapists travel to the child’s home to deliver care [154]. 
Policy makers could also consider approaches to encourage all providers to increase their 
supply of psychosocial services. These approaches would include increasing current levels 
of investment in policies to expand the mental health workforce capacity in clinics and 
practices that accept Medicaid, such as loan forgiveness programs [155, 156]. Another 
option would entail increasing Medicaid reimbursement rates for psychosocial services to 
enable clinics and practices to offer higher salaries than could be offered without the 
increased reimbursement rates as a strategy to improve recruitment and retention efforts of 
these providers [157]. 
4.4.1 Limitations 
This study had several limitations. First, our results were for 34 states; patterns in these 
states may differ from patterns in the rest of the country. Second, the latest data available 
were for 2013, before the Affordable Care Act went into effect. With an increase in the 
proportion of mental health services covered by health insurance after implementation of 
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the Affordable Care Act, the proportion of their caseload that providers dedicate to persons 
insured by Medicaid may have changed in recent years. For example, one study comparing 
a 2013-2014 survey with a 2016-2017 survey found that among outpatient substance use 
disorder treatment programs, the total number of clients remained constant but more clients 
used Medicaid during 2016-2017 than during 2013-2014 [158]. 
Third, our data relied on Medicaid claims. To be registered as a service to a child, a claim 
must have a child listed as the beneficiary rather than an adult family member. However, 
family therapies listing an adult family member as the beneficiary would still be of benefit 
for the child. Medicaid-enrolled children may also have other resources for obtaining 
psychosocial services, such as community or school programs, which do not bill Medicaid. 
However, we were unable to capture these data [122, 159]. 
Fourth, some providers bill solely through their organization’s NPI number. Our matching 
algorithm would link these providers only to the organization’s NPI number, preventing us 
from identifying the type of practitioner providing the service. This linkage of providers 
solely to an organization’s NPI number occurred for 20% of the psychosocial service 
providers. Similarly, some providers working for an organization may still bill as 
individuals, resulting in a lower caseload captured for that organization in the per-provider 
results than if the provider had billed through their organization. Although our address-
level analysis reduced the likelihood of these errors, it did not allow us to distinguish among 
individual provider types. Additionally, we assumed that all providers worked at their 
single practice address listed in NPPES, but some providers may travel to treat patients. A 
study in Georgia found that primary care providers had on average 2.6 practice locations 
whereas psychiatrists had 1.8 [160]. Finally, we examined only the caseload of 
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psychosocial services. Some providers may still see Medicaid beneficiaries for other 
mental health–related treatment, such as prescribing medication. 
4.5 Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this chapter presents the largest and most comprehensive to date 
examining Medicaid caseload for psychosocial services by a broad range of mental health 
providers. Most providers across all provider types had relatively low caseloads. Fewer 
than 10% of providers were responsible for more than half of services, with the largest 
proportion of services provided by mental health treatment centers. Services concentrated 




CHAPTER 5. INTEGRATION OF PRIMARY AND 
SPECIALIZED CARE: A DECENTRALIZED APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
Currently, the US healthcare system is highly fragmented, with specialists and primary care 
physicians working independently of each other. A patient with multiple chronic conditions 
may have to visit up to 16 healthcare providers in a year [161]. This leads to system 
inefficiencies and treatment inconsistencies, such as patients having to undergo redundant 
tests due to missing information [161-163]. Surveys among adults with chronic conditions 
found that if patients were seeing at least four physicians, medical records were not made 
available in time for a scheduled visit or duplicate tests were ordered 43% of the time 
whereas these mistakes occurred only 22% of the time if patients were seeing a single 
physician [164]. A study of pediatrician referrals found that the referred specialist received 
no information 49% of the time while the referring physician received no feedback 45% of 
the time [165]. Service duplication, unnecessary hospitalizations, medical complications, 
and patient non-adherence to care resulting from poor coordination was responsible for an 
estimated $25-$45 billion in wasteful spending in 2011 [166]. These redundancies and 
costs can be reduced while maintaining the same or better health outcomes by effective 
collaboration among specialty and primary care providers [167-169]. 
Collaborative care is defined as “ongoing working relationship between clinicians, rather 
than a specific product or activity" [170]. In collaborative care, healthcare providers 
combine their skills and knowledge to identify problems and treatments, and continually 
adapt provision of healthcare as needed. The terms such as integrated care, coordinated 
care, and care coordination have been used in the medical community to represent closely 
related concepts [170]. Collaborative care in the healthcare sector is crucial for more 
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effective and efficient delivery of healthcare services [171, 172], and it has been recognized 
by the Institute of Medicine as a key strategy for transforming healthcare quality that could 
potentially make the US healthcare system more effective, more efficient, and safer [173]. 
In this chapter, we particularly focus on collaborative care for children with mental health 
disorders. Nearly one in five U.S. children suffer from mental health conditions [174]. 
Among those children, at least 80% do not receive treatment for their mental health 
conditions [175]. However, almost 75% of these patients are seen in the pediatrician’s 
office, and hence primary care providers (PCPs) often provide the first line of treatment, 
identifying, diagnosing, and sometimes treating mental health disorders. After proper 
diagnosis by PCPs, these children should be referred to mental health specialized providers 
(MHPs) to receive specialty care. During the treatment, regular communication between 
PCPs and MHPs is necessary, and effective coordination of mental health, medical, and 
social needs is crucial to prevent unnecessary hospitalizations and emergency department 
use [175, 176]. Despite this, communication between MHPs and PCPs is historically 
known to be poor, and unlikely to improve without a systematic approach [175]. To 
estimate the impact of such an approach on access to healthcare services, realistic 
partnerships among participating providers must first be determined. 
This study evaluates the potential impact of a systematic approach to collaboration between 
MHPs and PCPs by developing a congestion game framework to connect PCPs with 
MHPs. More specifically, this framework captures preferences of both PCPs and MHPs, 
and its resulting solution is an equilibrium of the game that specifies each PCP needs to 
work with which MHP to provide collaborative care to children. The congestion game 
framework is a simplified perspective into the collaboration of PCPs and MHPs; however 
it is useful in understanding how access to mental health services could improve under such 
collaboration. 
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Congestion games were originally introduced by Rosenthal [177], whose model involves 
a set of players who must choose a subset from among a set of resources. The cost of using 
each resource depends on congestion, defined as the number of players who selected that 
resource, and each player’s goal is to minimize her own total cost. [177] demonstrated the 
existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, where no player can unilaterally reduce her cost. 
Ever since [177] seminal work, there have been various extensions in the structure of 
congestion games. To model the collaborative care problem as a congestion game, we 
consider each PCP as a player and each MHP as a resource. However, none of the existing 
models in congestion game literature can fully describe the main elements of the interaction 
between PCPs and MHPs. The best available model for our purpose is that of [178], which 
would allow MHPs to limit the number of PCPs with whom they can work and prioritize 
PCPs according to their own preferences. However, it imposes a restrictive assumption, 
specifically, that the cost of working with an MHP should be the same for all PCPs. 
Motivated by this shortcoming, in this chapter, we extend congestion games into a more 
general setting in which resources have capacities and preferences and the cost to use a 
resource can vary by player. Our contributions in this paper are both methodological and 
applied.  
The methodological contributions of this paper are: (i) We establish the existence of a pure 
Nash equilibrium for our more general setting by developing a polynomial-time algorithm 
to find such an equilibrium. (ii)  We investigate the more challenging problem of finding 
the minimum social cost pure equilibrium, which we show to be NP-hard. (iii) We develop 
a mixed-integer program (MIP) to solve this problem.  
We apply our methodological results to the problem of providing collaborative care by 
PCPs and MHPs to children with mental health conditions using real data provided by the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. We show that our equilibrium solution would  
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nearly double the number of children receiving mental health services under the 
coordinated care approach versus the traditional healthcare delivery, while meeting 
preferences of both PCPs and MHPs,  without significantly increasing the workload of the 
majority of MHPs. We additionally provide results demonstrating the efficiency of this 
healthcare delivery solution with respect to social cost. Finally, our model may be applied 
in other collaborative care applications, particularly between PCPs and secondary care 
providers. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we review the relevant 
literature. In Section 5.3, we formally introduce our congestion game setting. In Section 
5.4, we present theoretical results regarding the existence of a pure equilibrium and the 
computational complexity of finding the minimum social cost pure equilibrium.  Section 
5.5 provides an MIP formulation for the problem of finding the minimum social cost pure 
equilibrium. In Section 5.6, we describe the parameters of the collaborative care approach 
and the results of applying the congestion game model to evaluate collaborative care 
between PCPs and MHPs. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.7. 
5.2 Related Literature 
In this section, we review the relevant congestion game models to delineate distinctions of 
our model over the existing literature. 
Following the introduction of congestion games by [177], this class of games has been 
extended in various ways. Two particular classes of extensions which are of interest include 
(i) player-specific cost functions, and (ii) resources with preferences. We will elaborate on 
these two extensions below. 
Congestion games with player-specific cost functions (i.e., player-specific congestion 
games) allow players using the same resource to each have different cost rather than sharing 
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the same cost function. Such games are useful for modeling interference in wireless 
networks [179, 180], the service chain composition problem in network function 
virtualization [181], and the assignment of distribution facilities to population groups 
[182]. Congestion games with player-specific costs do not necessarily have a pure Nash 
equilibrium [183], and deciding in general whether a game has a pure Nash equilibrium is 
NP-complete [184]. To guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, it is necessary 
and sufficient that for each resource the cost functions for every pair of players are affine 
transformations of each other [185]. However, in the case where each player chooses only 
a single resource (called singleton congestion games), a pure Nash equilibrium has been 
proven to always exist when all cost functions are non-decreasing in congestion by  [186] 
using the concept of finite improvement path introduced by [187]. This result has been 
established more generally for matroid games, in which each player’s action space has a 
special combinatorial structure, i.e., the bases of a matroid, over the resources [188]. 
The other class of extensions is in allowing each resource to have its own preferences over 
the set of players. This may be further subclassified into uncapacitated games and 
capacitated games. In uncapacitated games, the resource only accommodates the most 
preferred players who have proposed to the resource. Note that a resource may have the 
same preference for multiple players, and there is no capacity limit for each resource. [189] 
showed that such games with player-specific costs and a matroid structure for the action 
space of each player, including singleton games, possess a pure Nash equilibrium that can 
be computed in polynomial time. 
The other subclass, capacitated games, with resources having their own capacities and 
preferences over players but not player-specific cost functions, has been studied by [178]. 
They provided polynomial time approaches to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in 
singleton capacitated congestion games and in capacitated congestion games with only two 
resources. However, they showed that determining whether such an equilibrium exists in 
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non-singleton games with at least three resources is NP-complete, even in the case of two 
players and symmetric strategies. 
What distinguishes our study from the literature is that we consolidate the two above-
mentioned directions of extensions into a single general setting. More specifically, we 
introduce a class of singleton congestion games with both player-specific costs and 
resource capacity. For our more general setting, the results of  [178] imply that identifying 
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. Hence, we impose the assumption 
of non-decreasing cost in congestion under which we provide a polynomial-time approach 
to identify a pure Nash equilibrium. This assumption is natural and holds in many practical 
settings including our collaborative care problem. Moreover, we show that the more 
challenging problem of finding the least social cost pure equilibrium is NP-hard, which we 
solve by developing an MIP formulation. 
5.3 Capacitated Singleton Congestion Game Model 
A capacitated singleton congestion game, as studied by [178], may informally be described 
as a set of players and resources, in which each player should choose only one resource 
among the available resources to the player. Moreover, each resource has a limited capacity 
and a preference rule over players to select among the players who have proposed the 
resource. The player's cost of choosing each resource only depends on the number of 
players who have chosen that resource. The structure of this game makes it a natural choice 
for modeling of the collaborative care problem. To illustrate this, consider a general 
overview of interactions between PCPs and MHPs, described below. 
Each PCP based on her own preference offers an MHP to collaborate. Once each MHP has 
received the offers of collaborations from different PCPs, he should select which one to 
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accept, based on his preference and his available capacity. Moreover, the utility of each 
PCP is only affected by the number of PCPs who work with the same MHP, and each MHP 
has his own preference over different PCPs to work with. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
to model this application as a congestion game where PCPs and MHPs correspond, 
respectively, to players and resources. However, there is a major shortcoming in the 
congestion game model of [178] which prevents us from directly applying it to our 
collaborative care setting. More specifically, in the model of [178], the cost of choosing a 
specific resource is identical for all players while in our application, this cost varies across 
different players. This has motivated us to extend capacitated singleton congestion games 
into a more general setting with player-specific costs. We formally define this generalized 
class of congestion games in the rest of this section. 
Our capacitated singleton congestion game with player-specific costs consists of a set 𝒩 
containing 𝑛 players and a set ℛ containing 𝑚 resources. Each player 𝑖 has her own private 
cost function for utilizing resource 𝑗, denoted by 𝑑𝑖𝑗(⋅). Each resource 𝑗 has its own positive 
capacity 𝐾𝑗 and ranking for each player 𝑖, denoted by 𝑝𝑖𝑗, with lower ranks indicating 
higher preference. We assume preferences are strict, meaning at each resource, no two 
players share a rank. Each player's strategy consists of proposing to a single resource, and 
we denote σ𝑖 as the resource player 𝑖 proposed to and σ = (σ1, σ2, … , σ𝑛) as a vector 
containing the strategies of all players. We allow our games to be asymmetric, meaning 
player's action space Σ𝑖 (that is, the set of all possible strategies player 𝑖 can choose from) 
can be a nonempty subset of ℛ (i.e., σ𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖 ⊆ ℛ). 
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Once a player 𝑖 has proposed to a resource 𝑗 (i.e., σ𝑖 = 𝑗), the resource can decide whether 
to accommodate that player based on its capacity. If the player is not accommodated, that 
player will incur infinite cost. If the player is accommodated, that player will incur a cost 
according to her cost function for that resource, 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗), where 𝑛𝑗  denotes the congestion 
at resource 𝑗, defined as the number of players who are being accommodated by this 
resource. Motivated by our healthcare application, we assume that 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗) is non-
decreasing in congestion. Under strategy profile σ, the player’s final cost 𝑓𝑖 will therefore 
equal the following: 
𝑓𝑖 = {
𝑑𝑖σ𝑖(𝑛σ𝑖), σ𝑖 accommodates 𝑖
∞, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
All players act simultaneously in this game, and a resource must accommodate all players 
that propose to it until its capacity is met. If the number of players who propose to a 
resource exceeds its capacity, the resource only accommodates players who are the most 
preferred based on the previously defined notion of rank. We say a resource is saturated if 
its congestion equals its capacity (i.e., 𝑛𝑗 = 𝐾𝑗). Otherwise, the resource is called 
unsaturated. 
5.4 Equilibrium: Existence, Selection, and Complexity 
In this section, we present our methodological results regarding the existence of an 
equilibrium and the computational complexity of finding one with minimum social cost. 
We provide all the proofs Appendix D. We start by demonstrating the existence of a pure 
equilibrium in our generalized setting of congestion games when all player-specific cost 
functions 𝑑𝑖𝑗 are non-decreasing in congestion. To fulfill this, we follow an inductive 
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approach to construct an equilibrium of an 𝑛-player game using an equilibrium of an 
(𝑛 − 1)-player game. This constructive approach is formally presented in the next theorem. 
Theorem 1: Suppose we have a player-specific singleton capacitated congestion game on 
𝑛 − 1 players at a pure equilibrium. Assume that all player cost functions accommodated 
by a resource 𝑗 are non-decreasing with the congestion of resource 𝑗. If an additional 
player 𝑃𝑛, with a cost function non-decreasing in congestion, is added, the new game can 
again reach a pure equilibrium. 
The existence of a pure equilibrium is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1, which is 
formalized in the next theorem. The proof of Theorem 1, provided in Appendix D, also 
gives the algorithm to find such an equilibrium. For a game with 𝑛 players and 𝑚 resources, 
this algorithm is able to reach an equilibrium with at most 𝑂(𝑛3𝑚2) strategy changes. 
Theorem 2: A pure Nash equilibrium exists for any player-specific singleton capacitated 
congestion game for which all player cost functions are non-decreasing with resource 
congestion. 
The proof of this theorem is in Appendix D. Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a pure 
Nash equilibrium, but we have not ascertained its uniqueness. In fact, each congestion 
game may have multiple pure equilibria; this naturally leads to the following equilibrium 
selection problem: Given a social cost function, which pure equilibrium has the minimum 
social cost? In this paper, we adopt the commonly used utilitarian social cost function, 
defined as the sum of all players' costs. The equilibrium selection problem is important for 
a couple of reasons as discussed below.   
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In many applications, including the motivating application of this paper, there exists a 
social planner who is in a higher level of decision making. This planner is interested in 
complying with the autonomy of the players while reaching a socially optimal outcome. 
This means the planner has the opportunity to choose an equilibrium with minimum social 
cost, which results into the above-mentioned equilibrium selection problem. The planner 
cannot enforce the obtained equilibrium, but she can provide recommendations to the 
players about which action they need to follow. Each player would not be better off by a 
unilateral deviation from the prescribed recommendation; this implies the enforceability of 
the minimum cost equilibrium. 
Measuring inefficiency of equilibria has gained considerable attention in game theory, 
when the social cost of the game is compared with that of a centrally designed system 
[190]. In other words, we measure how much cost the system incurs due to the autonomy 
of players. This cost is insightful for the social planner since it indicates how well the 
current system works. In fact, if the cost is high, the social planner may need to pursue 
possible initiatives to decrease it. Price of stability is one of the well-known metrics to 
measure such an inefficiency, and it is defined as the ratio of the social cost of a minimum 
cost equilibrium to that of a minimum cost strategy profile [191]. A variation of this notion 
is pure price of stability, for which the set of pure equilibria is considered in the numerator 
of the ratio. By finding a minimum cost pure equilibrium, we can compute the pure price 
of stability which has the above-mentioned managerial insights. 
In the following, we establish the computational complexity of the equilibrium selection 
problem. For the congestion game setting of [177], [192] showed that the problem of 
finding a pure equilibrium is PLS-complete. For our congestion game, the proof of 
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Theorem 2 presents a polynomial-time approach to find a pure equilibrium. However, the 
problem of finding a best pure equilibrium intuitively seems more challenging. The next 
theorem addresses this question formally. 
Theorem 3: The problem of finding a minimum social cost pure equilibrium is strongly 
NP-hard. 
5.5 MIP Formulation of Equilibrium Selection 
As the problem of finding a minimum cost pure equilibrium is NP-hard, no polynomial-
time algorithm can solve it unless 𝑃 = 𝑁𝑃. However, it is crucial to develop a solution 
method that can solve it in practice. Mixed-integer programming (MIP) is a powerful tool 
to model and solve discrete optimization problems, and it has already been used in the 
literature to identify equilibria of game theory models [193, 194]. In this section, we 
develop an MIP formulation to characterize pure equilibria of the congestion game, and 
subsequently find the one with the least social cost. The parameters and decision variables 
of our model are as follows: 
• 𝒩 ≔ {1,2, … , 𝑛} denotes the set of players.  
• ℛ ≔ {1,2, … , 𝑚} denotes the set of resources. 
• 𝒦𝒿 ≔ {1,2, … , 𝐾𝑗} denotes the set of possible positive values for congestion of each 
resource 𝑗 ∈ ℛ. 
• 𝑦𝑖𝑗: A binary variable where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1 means that player 𝑖 chooses resource 𝑗, and 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. 
• 𝑐𝑗: A variable denoting the congestion level of resource 𝑗. Clearly, 𝑐𝑗 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑖 . 
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• 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘: A binary variable used to model the nonlinear cost function of player 𝑖. More 
specifically, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1 if and only if 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1 and 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑘.  
• 𝑧𝑗𝑘: A binary variable used to model the nonlinear cost function of player 𝑖 if she 
chooses to switch to resource 𝑗. More specifically, 𝑧𝑗𝑘 = 1 if and only if congestion 
of resource 𝑗 is 𝑘. Note that 𝑧𝑗𝐾𝑗 = 1 implies that resource 𝑗 is saturated. Note that 
the index 𝑘 may take any integer value from 0 to 𝐾𝑗. 
• 𝑓𝑖: A variable denoting the cost of player 𝑖. 
• 𝑜𝑖𝑗: A binary variable where 𝑜𝑖𝑗 = 1 if and only if resource 𝑗 is saturated, and  
player 𝑖 is accommodated by the resource in the case where she chooses to switch 
her decision to resource 𝑗. 
• 𝑞𝑖𝑗: A binary variable where 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1 if and only if resource 𝑗 is saturated, and  
player 𝑖 is not accommodated by the resource in the case where she chooses to 
switch her decision to resource 𝑗. 
We present the following MIP polyhedron to characterize pure equilibria of the game.  
  ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑘∈𝒦𝒿𝑗∈ℛ = 1  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 (5.1a) 
  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑗  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦𝒿 (5.1b) 
  ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑗∈ℛ = 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩  (5.1c) 
  𝑐𝑗 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝒩   ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1d) 
  𝑐𝑗 = ∑ 𝑘𝑘∈{0}∪𝒦𝒿 𝑧𝑗𝑘  ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1e) 
  ∑ 𝑧𝑗𝑘𝑘∈{0}∪𝒦𝒿 = 1  ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1f) 
  0 ≤ 𝑐𝑗 − ∑ 𝑘𝑘∈𝒦𝒿 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≤ 𝐾𝑗(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗)  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1g) 
  𝑓𝑖 = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑘)𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑘∈𝒦𝒿𝑗∈ℛ   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 (5.1h) 
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  𝑓𝑖 ≤ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑘)𝑧𝑗(𝑘−1)𝑘∈𝒦𝒿 + 𝑀𝑧𝑗𝐾𝑗   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1i) 
  𝑓𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝐾𝑗) + 𝑀(1 − 𝑜𝑖𝑗)  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1j) 
  ∑ 𝑦𝑖′𝑗𝑖′:𝑝𝑖′𝑗>𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀(1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗)  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1k) 
  𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑧𝑗𝐾𝑗 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ  (5.1l) 
  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘, 𝑦𝑖𝑗, 𝑧𝑗𝑘 , 𝑜𝑖𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦𝒿  (5.1m) 
  𝑧𝑗𝑘 ∈ {0,1}  ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ, 𝑘 ∈ {0} ∪ 𝒦𝒿 (5.1n) 
  𝑐𝑗 , 𝑓𝑖  unrestricted  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1o) 
where 𝑀 denotes a large number. A specific number should be substituted for the big-M 
coefficients in constraints (5.1i), (5.1j), and (5.1k) when the polyhedron  (5.1a)-(5.1o) is 
given to an MIP solver. For this purpose, the big-M coefficients should be appropriate 
upper bounds such that the polyhedron (5.1a)-(5.1o) includes all pure equilibria.  The big-




{𝑑𝑖?̅?(𝐾?̅?)} − 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝐾𝑗), and the size of 
the set {𝑖′: 𝑝𝑖′𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑗} for constraints (5.1i), (5.1j), and (5.1k), associated with each 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 
and 𝑗 ∈ ℛ, respectively. Note that constraints (5.1a), (5.1c), and (5.1f) are specially ordered 
sets of type 1, a set of variables of which exactly one member may be nonzero in each 
feasible solution. Moreover, we need an objective function to be able to  choose among all 
pure equilibria, and the utilitarian objective function (i.e., ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑖∈𝒩 ) is a natural choice here 
as noted earlier. 
Theorem 4: When the sum of capacity of all resources are greater than or equal to the 
number of players, i.e., ∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗∈ℛ ≥ 𝑛, the polyhedron (5.1a)-(5.1o) characterizes all pure 
equilibria of the congestion game. 
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The above theorem needs the regularity condition ∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗∈ℛ ≥ 𝑛. If this condition is violated, 
we can easily transform the game to one which satisfies such a condition, and its equilibria 
has a one-to-one correspondence with those of the original game. For this purpose, we only 
need to add a dummy resource which has an unlimited capacity, and the cost of choosing 
this resource is strictly larger than the highest possible cost of choosing any other resource. 
An interesting special case of the game is when the cost function is linear with respect to 
congestion, i.e., 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑗) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗. For such a case, we can present a more 
parsimonious MIP formulation to characterize pure equilibria of the game. In fact, we no 
longer need the variables 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 and 𝑧𝑗𝑘, of the formulation (5.1a)-(5.1o). Following the same 
line of arguments as that of the formulation (5.1a)-(5.1o), we can develop the following 
formulation: 
  ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑗∈ℛ = 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩  (5.2a) 
  𝑐𝑗 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑖∈𝒩   ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2b) 
  𝑐𝑗 = 𝑧?̃? + 𝑧?̅?  ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2c) 
  −𝑀(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗) ≤ 𝑓𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑗)  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2d) 
  𝑓𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝑀𝑧?̅?  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2e) 
  𝑓𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝐾𝑗) + 𝑀(1 − 𝑜𝑖𝑗)  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2f) 
  ∑ 𝑦𝑖′𝑗𝑖′:𝑝𝑖′𝑗>𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑀(1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗)  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2g) 
  𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑧?̅?  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2h) 
  𝑧?̃? ≤ 𝐾𝑗 − 1 ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ  (5.2i) 
  𝑦𝑖𝑗 , 𝑧?̅?, 𝑜𝑖𝑗, 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦𝒿  (5.2j) 
  𝑧?̃? ∈ 𝑍+  ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.1k) 
  𝑐𝑗 , 𝑓𝑖  unrestricted  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ ℛ (5.2l) 
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Note that the new variables 𝑧?̅? and 𝑧?̃? are introduced to identify whether resource 𝑗 is 
saturated. In fact, 𝑧?̅? = 1 if and only if resource 𝑗 is saturated.   
5.6 Primary Care Physicians and Behavior Care Specialists Integration 
We can use the congestion game model introduced in Section 5.3 to obtain a potential 
matching between primary care providers (PCPs) and mental health (specialized) providers 
(MHPs) that could be used to coordinate primary care and mental health services, 
specifically, focusing on psychosocial services. We specifically consider collaborative 
care, in which PCPs and MHPs form an ongoing relationship and work together to deliver 
care to patients [170]. There are different levels of collaborative care ranging from minimal 
collaboration, in which providers rarely communicate, to merged practices where providers 
share a practice space and act as a unified team [195]. We focus on collaborative care in 
which PCPs regularly consult with MHPs about their patients. Such collaboration is 
especially important for children as most children with behavioral health conditions are 
treated in primary care settings rather than mental health settings [196]. Communication 
and treatment can occur through the use of telehealth tools such as videoconferencing 
rather than co-location [197-200]. This is particularly useful in areas where patients do not 
have access to mental health providers. Collaborative care has been implemented in various 
clinics and has been shown to be effective [195, 201]. 
We illustrate our analysis for the Medicaid-insured child population (age ≤ 18) in the state 
of New York. New York was selected since we were able to attribute over 90% of 
psychosocial services in that state to individual mental health providers. However, our 
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methodology can be applied to any state and healthcare setting for which the necessary 
provider data can be obtained.  
Data primarily comes from two sources: the 2013 National Plan and Provider Enumeration 
System (NPPES) [38], which lists the National Provider Identifier (NPI) of all providers 
that electronically bill for services along with their primary taxonomy and practice address, 
and the 2013 Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) [40], which contains all Medicaid claims 
made in 2013 as well as the age, county, and zip code of Medicaid beneficiaries. Urbanicity 
of each provider was determined using the 2010 Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) 
code [144] of their practice location census tract and urbanicity of each child was 
determined using Zip Code RUCA Approximation [144], with RUCA codes 1-3 
representing large urban areas, codes 4-6 representing small urban areas, and codes 7-10 
representing rural areas. 
5.6.1 Model Calibration 
In this subsection, we illustrate how we apply the congestion game framework to model 
our healthcare application. For this purpose, we should identify components of the game, 
i.e., players, resources, costs, capacities, preferences, and action spaces. 
Players, resources, and action space: We identified individual PCPs and MHPs in New 
York through their primary taxonomy code and practice location as listed in the NPPES 
data. We considered only those serving Medicaid-insured children, that is PCPs who billed 
at least 11 Medicaid-insured children and MHPs who provided psychosocial services to at 
least 11 Medicaid-insured children, determined using the MAX claims. A minimum of 11 
children was selected because that is the minimum required to maintain patient 
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confidentiality when using the MAX claims. We assumed PCPs working in the same office 
as an MHP already have a working relationship with that MHP and would therefore 
collaborate with that MHP. Thus, we further considered only PCPs not co-located with an 
MHP and MHPs not co-located with a PCP. 
We additionally assumed that PCPs sharing an office with each other would realistically 
work with the same MHP when possible. For such a restriction to be incorporated into our 
model, PCPs sharing a location should be treated as the same player. However, a location 
with a large number of PCPs or especially busy PCPs matched to a single MHP may 
overwhelm that MHP. Therefore, we grouped PCPs sharing a location together up to a limit 
representing the demand an MHP can handle. We set this limit to be the median number of 
Medicaid-insured child visits among all PCPs. Specifically, we grouped PCPs together 




⌉), where 𝑞 is the number of PCPs at the location, 𝑣 is the number of visits by 
Medicaid-insured children observed from those PCPs in 2013, and 250 is the median 
number of Medicaid-insured child visits among all PCPs in 2013. We used these PCPGs 
as our players. Thus, our player set 𝒩 consisted of 4,337 PCPGs (representing 4,637 
PCPs), and our resource set ℛ consisted of 1,000 MHPs. We assumed any MHP could be 
matched to any PCPG. That is, Σ𝑖 = ℛ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩. 







 where 𝑤𝑖 is a weight associated with PCPG 𝑖 which was randomly generated 
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the travel distance between the 
practice locations of PCPG 𝑖 and MHP 𝑗 (obtained using ArcGIS software), 𝑀 is the 
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maximum permissible distance between two providers (set to be 500 miles), 𝑛𝑗  is 
congestion of resource 𝑗, and 𝐶 is the maximum capacity across all resources. Note that 
both the distance and congestion measures are normalized so that 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is within the interval 
[0,1]. 
Capacities and preferences: Capacity 𝐾𝑗 of resource 𝑗 was assumed to scale with the 
number of psychosocial service visits provided to Medicaid-insured children in 2013. 
Specifically, it was equal to 1 if the number of observed visits was less than 500 
(representing approximately 10 visits available a week), equal to 2 if the number of 
observed visits was between 500 and 1,000, and equal to 3 if the number of observed visits 
was greater than 1,000. Finally, for each MHP, PCPGs at locations that share patients with 
the MHP were given first preference, in order of the number of patients shared between 
that location and the MHP. Remaining PCPGs followed in order of distance between the 
MHP and the PCPG location. 
Before concluding this subsection, we highlight a simplification that we have made in the 
decision-making sequence of the congestion game, compared to our collaborative care 
problem. The interaction between PCPGs and MHPs occur over a dynamic setting where 
PCPGs are not enforced to act simultaneously. Despite this, the congestion game captures 
important characteristics of this interaction for the following reasons: (i) When a PCPG 
finds an MHP, it barely changes its decision over a short period of time due to the 
inconvenience of finding a new MHP.  (ii) In our proof for the existence of a pure 
equilibrium for the congestion game, we add one player at a time and allow players to 
iteratively follow their cost minimizing strategy, and show that players will converge to an 
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equilibrium in a finite number of iterations. This informally implies that in a dynamic 
environment where PCPGs choose their favorite MHPs with available capacity at each 
point of time, they will reach within a finite time to the equilibrium derived from our static 
simultaneous-move congestion game. 
5.6.2 Computation and Efficiency of Equilibria 
In this subsection, we report and derive insights from our computational results regarding 
finding an equilibrium and measuring its inefficiency, as discussed earlier in Section 5.4. 
For this purpose, we have investigated the following three decision-making approaches, 
and have measured the performance of their outputs using the utilitarian objective function 
(i.e., the sum of all players' costs). 
(i) The proof of Theorem 2 provides a polynomial-time algorithm to find an 
equilibrium of the game. We refer to this approach as Algorithm. 
(ii) The MIP formulation (5.2a)-(5.2l) presents an approach to find the least social 
cost equilibrium. We refer to this approach as Decentralized MIP. Note, in our 
implementation, we provided the equilibrium found by the first approach as a 
warm-start solution for this MIP.  
(iii) A centralized decision-making setting is defined as when players have no 
autonomy, and each player has to follow the strategy prescribed by a social 
planner who seeks to minimize the utilitarian objective function. This strategy 
profile prescribed by the social planner may be computed by dropping the 
equilibrium constraints, i.e., (5.2e)-(5.2h), in the MIP formulation (5.2a)-(5.2l). 
We refer to this approach as Centralized MIP. 
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Note, since the total number of players is higher than the total capacity across all resources, 
we added a dummy resource with a cost of 1.1 to Decentralized MIP and Centralized MIP 
for the technical reasons discussed after Theorem 4. 
All three approaches were implemented in Python 2.7.16 and run through HTCondor 
version 8.8.9. Decentralized MIP and Centralized MIP were solved using CPLEX version 
12.8.0 through the Python API with a maximum runtime of 10 hours and maximum 
memory available for working storage of 16GB. As expected, both Decentralized MIP and 
Centralized MIP were computationally demanding, exceeding memory limitations when 
trying to solve the instance associated with the complete set of PCPGs and MHPs in our 
application. Hence, we generated and solved smaller-size instances selected by randomly 
sampling a subset of PCPGs and MHPs.  
The specifications of these instances and the computational results for the three above 
decision-making approaches are reported in Table 19. In this table, “PCPG” and “MHP” 
are the number of players and resources, respectively, and “Accom” is the total number of 
accommodated players. “Tot Cost” is the total cost over all players, with unaccommodated 
players assigned a value of 1.1 while “Acc Cost” is the cost over only the accommodated 
players. “Gap” is the relative optimality gap of the given solution, computed within 
CPLEX.  
Table 19 indicates that Algorithm is able to quickly find an equilibrium that is desirable 
with respect to the utilitarian objective function as demonstrated in the following.  
Centralized MIP searches over all strategy profiles while the search space of Decentralized 
MIP is only restricted to equilibria. Hence, the optimal objective value of Centralized MIP 
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provides a lower bound on that of Decentralized MIP, and on the objective value of the 
resulting equilibrium from Algorithm. Since all these values are close to each other, it 
indicates that Algorithm finds an equilibrium with nearly the least social cost among all 
pure equilibria. As the social cost of the equilibrium is close to that of Centralized MIP, it 
implies that there is not much gain to move into a centralized setting as illustrated in more 
detail next. 
Table 19. Solution quality and runtime under three decision-making approaches for 
small-size instances. 
PCPG MHP Accom Algorithm Decentralized MP Centralized MP 
Tot Cost Acc Cost Tot Cost Acc Cost Tot Cost Acc Cost 
251 140 154 140.02 33.319 140.02 33.319 124.22 17.522 
469 244 269 276.31 56.309 276.31 56.309 271.62 50.519 
1050 342 378 819.01 79.807 819.00 79.807 790.82 51.616 
628 400 446 304.54 104.343 304.54 104.343 304.54 104.343 
PCPG MHP Accom Algorithm Decentralized MP Centralized MP 
Time (s) Time (s) Gap (%) Time (s) Gap (%) 
251 140 154 0.1 36035.9 19.4 36011.6 14.1 
469 244 269 0.4 36077.9 20.4 36031.9 19.0 
1050 342 378 3.3 36578.2 9.4 36078.7 6.5 
628 400 446 1.9 36112.6 34.3 36013.4 34.3 
Recall that in a centralized setting, players have no autonomy and are imposed to act 
according to the decision making of the social planner. Since in such a setting, the social 
planner only seeks to minimize the social cost without being restrained by incentives of 
individual players, it always leads to a lower social cost compared to a decentralized 
setting. However, this advantage comes at the cost of depriving the players from their 
ability to choose, which makes the proposed solution unstable and not necessarily 
enforceable. When the difference of social cost between the centralized and decentralized 
settings are small (i.e., the price of stability is close to 1), it implies that the marginal gain 
of a centralized setting is low, and hence there is not enough motivation and justification 
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to the social planner to intervene in the natural interaction among the players presented by 
the decentralized setting.  In summary, our discussion implies that the resulting equilibrium 
from Algorithm is efficient. 
For the full-size instance of our congestion game model with 4,337 PCPGs and 1,000 
MHPs, Algorithm finds an equilibrium within 18 seconds. Under this equilibrium, 1,100 
PCPGs (25.36%) were accommodated by a resource. Total cost among those 
accommodated was 233.2632. The MIP was unable to find a solution for this instance 
within the memory limits. However, the result of Centralized MIP suggests that this 
equilibrium is efficient. In the remainder of this paper, we will investigate this equilibrium 
with respect to other criteria and measure its gains over the existing practice. 
5.6.3 Implications for Patients 
For the equilibrium solution to be beneficial if implemented, it must increase access to 
mental healthcare for children, quantified as the number of children who receive 
psychological service. Our algorithm does not directly maximize the number of children 
with access to collaborative care. Instead, it assigns as many PCPGs to MHPs as possible. 
We assumed that if a child's PCP was accommodated by an MHP, that child received access 
to collaborative care. In this subsection, we first quantify the proportion of children granted 
access to collaborative psychosocial services, overall and by urbanicity. We then verify 
that access improved under our model when compared with a matching approach based on 
current practices; this improvement occurred throughout the entire state. 
To quantify access resulting from our congestion game model, we used the MAX data to 
assign each Medicaid-insured child to a single PCP. This was the PCP in the state (not 
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limited to those in our player set) with whom they had the most visits. If that PCP belonged 
to a PCPG within our player set, we defined that child's assigned PCPG to be that PCPG. 
We then measured the percentage of children with access, that is, the percentage of children 
assigned a PCPG within our player set that received access to collaborative psychosocial 
services under our model equilibrium solution. We additionally computed this percentage 
considering only children that received psychosocial services in 2013 since these are the 
children most likely to utilize psychosocial services. Results are shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Access metrics under two matching scenarios. 












As intended, our algorithm granted children access to psychosocial services via their PCP. 
In particular, the proportion of children who received access and the proportion of 
psychosocial service-receiving children who received access under the collaborative 
framework were both around twice as high as the proportion of PCPGs accommodated by 
an MHP, suggesting our parameter settings for MHP preferences resulted in our algorithm 
giving some priority to PCPGs responsible for more children. That is, MHPs shared more 
of their patients with PCPGs who had a large patient caseload than with PCPGs who had a 
smaller caseload, leading to high-patient-volume PCPGs being more preferred and 
therefore being more likely to be accommodated. Specifically, while only 25.36% of 
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PCPGs were accommodated by an MHP using our algorithm, these accommodated PCPGs 
accounted for 48.74% of children and 52.10% of the children who received psychosocial 
services. Of the 414 PCPGs that were assigned to fewer than 30 children, only 5.8% were 
accommodated whereas of the 456 that were assigned to more than 1,000 children, 63.8% 
were accommodated. 
Access was expanded throughout the state rather than concentrated in one geography. 
Across urbanicity levels, the percentage of players accommodated ranged from 20% in 
rural areas to 25% in large urban areas to 30\% in small urban areas, and the percentage of 
psychosocial service-receiving children ranged from 44.96% in small urban areas to 
47.15% in rural areas to 53.56% in large urban areas (Table 21). 
Table 21. Access metrics by urbanicity, under two matching scenarios. 
Metric Congestion Game Algorithm Observation-based Matching 
Large Urban Small Urban Rural Large Urban Small Urban Rural 
PCPGs 
Accommodated (%) 
25.38 29.92 20.17 13.91 21.65 32.77 
Children with Access 
(%) 
49.06 46.57 44.68 12.98 25.61 23.51 
Psychosocial service-
receiving children with 
access (%) 
53.56 44.96 47.15 12.69 26.72 25.25 
 
To determine whether access has increased, we should compare our algorithm with current 
practices. However, as we do not know exactly which PCPGs already practice 
collaborative care, we instead compared our algorithm with an alternate matching method 
that more closely resembles how providers were behaving, which we called the 
observation-based matching approach. This approach was used to represent current 
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practices and provide a baseline access measurement. In this observation-based matching 
approach, for each PCP location, we considered the Medicaid-insured children that were 
assigned a PCPG at that location and sought psychosocial services. If a large proportion of 
these children visited the same MHP, we assumed PCPs at that location had a collaborative 
relationship with that MHP. Specifically, for every 1/3 of these children visiting the same 
MHP, we matched one PCPG at that location with that MHP. 
Our algorithm does perform better than matching PCPs with MHPs based on current 
behaviors. Compared with the observation-based matching approach, our algorithm 
accommodated 9.95% more PCPGs, granting integrated care to over twice as many 
children (48.74% versus 14.13%). For all urbanicity levels and for 55 of New York's 62 
counties, more psychosocial service-receiving children had integrated care access under 
our algorithm than under the observation-based method (Figure 15). Much of this 
difference can be explained by all MHPs being assigned to at least one PCP under our 
algorithm while only 29.1% of MHPs were under the observation-based method. 
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PCPGs Accommodated (%) 
  
Congestion Game-based Algorithm Observation-based Matching 
Psychosocial Service-receiving Children Accommodated (%) 
  
Congestion Game-based Algorithm Observation-based Matching 
Figure 15. County-level maps of percent of primary care groups (PCPGs) and percent 
of psychosocial service-receiving children accommodated under two matching 
methods. Grey counties had fewer than 11 children assigned to PCPGs in our player 
set. 
5.6.4 Implications for Providers 
For providers to elect to participate in collaborative care using our equilibrium solution, 
their preferences must be met and their workload cannot heavily increase. In this 
subsection, we examine the effect our solution would have on providers. Specifically, we 
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first investigate the extent that preferences of both PCPs and MHPs are met and we next 
assess that MHP caseload is not negatively impacted. 
We assumed that PCPGs would prefer nearby MHPs and MHPs with less congestion. 
These preferences were incorporated into the cost functions of each PCPG as described in 
subsection 5.6.1, and our congestion game-based algorithm was designed to make the least-
cost move for each PCPG in each iteration. Among the 1,100 accommodated PCPGs, 
average cost per PCPG was 0.2121, but it ranged from 0.0008 to 0.9612. The resulting 
distances ranged from near 0 miles to around 364 miles, with the majority being under 12 
miles (Figure 16). Costs and distances do depend on the selected components of the player 
cost functions. For example, under our parameter settings, costs per PCPG at equilibrium 
are generally positively correlated with the weight given to congestion (i.e. 1 − 𝑤𝑖, as 
described in subsection 5.6.1). That is, PCPGs placing more importance on reducing 
distance generally had lower costs due to the wider range of possible distances. Some 
PCPGs, however, were forced to have large distances despite having a higher weight on 
distance than congestion due to few nearby MHPs. For example, Chautauqua county, the 
westernmost county in New York, had 31 PCPGs in their player set but only 6 MHPs in 
their resource set, each with a capacity of 1 and some preferring PCPGs in the neighboring 
counties, resulting in 3 PCPGs being accommodated by MHPs 364 miles away who had 
the available capacity and 25 remaining unaccommodated. Providers matched at such large 
distances can still communicate with each other and provide care to patients through 




Figure 16. Histogram of the distance between each accommodated player and their 
matched resource. 
Although each step of our algorithm involved finding the least-cost MHP for each PCPG 
rather than finding the most-preferred PCPG for each MHP, MHPs still generally received 
their preferred choices of PCPG. This is due to children typically seeking providers to 
whom they can easily travel, creating a relationship between providers being close in 
distance (considered in PCPG preferences via their cost functions, with lower distances 
preferred) and providers sharing patients (considered in MHP preferences, with more 
shared patients preferred). Statistically, 38% of MHPs were paired with their most 
preferred PCPG, and 65.8% only work with PCPGs that were among their three most 
preferred. Only 0.62% of MHPs had to work with a PCPG outside their top ten, with the 
worst preference rank being 40. 
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Next, we examine the effect of collaborative care on MHP caseload. We consider for each 
MHP their child caseload, defined as the number of Medicaid-insured children receiving 
psychosocial services from that MHP in 2013, and their visit caseload, defined as the total 
number of psychosocial service visits they provided to Medicaid-insured children in 2013. 
We compare the caseloads observed in 2013 with those after implementing collaborative 
care, estimated by considering a scenario where children assigned to accommodate PCPGs 
received all their psychosocial service visits in 2013 from the matched MHP rather than 
from their original providers. 
The majority of MHPs were not heavily burdened by increased annual caseload after 
collaborative care implementation. In 2013, median child psychosocial patient caseload 
and visit caseload for the MHPs were observed to be 19 patients and 129 visits. Boxplots 
comparing the psychosocial caseload per MHP observed in the 2013 claims, after 
collaboration under our algorithm, and after collaboration under the observation-based 
matching approach described in subsection 5.6.3 are shown in Figure 17. Per provider 
caseload under both matching methods was similar to that observed in the 2013 claims. 
Using our algorithm, median caseload was only 1 child and 7 visits higher than that 
observed. In fact, only 101 of the 1,000 MHPs (10.1%) experienced a caseload increase of 
at least 10 children under our algorithm as compared with that observed in 2013. Only 
9.5% experienced an increase of at least 100 visits. This means most MHPs would have 




Mental Health Provider Patient Caseload 
  
Mental Health Provider Visit Caseload 
  
Figure 17. Boxplots of mental health provider caseload, measured in visits and 
children, as observed in 2013 and under two matching methods, with and without 
outliers displayed. 
 
County-level maps displaying median caseload are given in Figure 18, and caseload by 
urbanicity is given in Table 22. Caseload increase was primarily driven by large urban 
areas, where 89.3% of the MHPs practice. For rural areas, the difference was lessened, with 
median caseload under our algorithm being just 1 visit higher. For small urban areas, 
median caseload was instead reduced by 13 visits. 
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Median Patient Caseload 
  
Congestion Game-based Algorithm Observed in 2013 
Median Visit Caseload 
  
Congestion Game-based Algorithm Observed in 2013 
Figure 18. County-level maps of median psychosocial caseload per mental health 
provider, in children and visits, observed in 2013 and under our algorithm. Grey 
counties had no mental health providers in our resource set. 
 
Table 22. Median caseload among mental health providers, by urbanicity. 
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In this chapter, we introduced a method of partnering PCPs with MHPs while considering 
the capacities and preferences of both provider types for the purpose of evaluating 
collaborative care. This method extends singleton congestion games to consider cases in 
which each player has its own private cost function and each resource has a capacity and 
preferences over the players. In proving that such games have a pure Nash equilibrium, we 
developed a polynomial time algorithm to find an equilibrium solution. While this 
algorithm may not produce the Nash equilibrium resulting in the greatest social good, in 
the context of collaborative primary care and psychosocial services in New York, it can 
still produce a solution comparable to the optimal found using an MIP in a fraction of the 
time.  If the solution would be implemented, it suggests that collaborative care can increase 
access to mental health services without greatly burdening healthcare providers. 
Specifically, 49% of children would have access to psychosocial services via their PCP. 
Increase in access occurs for all three urbanicity levels and for the majority of counties, 
suggesting that it does not favor one portion of the state over the rest. In spite of this 
increase, the median patient caseload for MHPs would only have to increase by 1 child. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
Understanding disparities in healthcare access is important when designing effective policy 
interventions to improve the healthcare system. In this thesis, we demonstrated the value 
of using local-level data to obtain spatial access estimates that can be used to identify 
significant disparities and inform on their underlying cause. We also simulated policy 
interventions to assess their impact on access to care. We focused on three healthcare 
settings: pediatric primary care, adult primary care, and pediatric mental health. 
For pediatric primary care, we found among our seven selected states, between-state and 
within-state differences in median travel distance and median congestion were mostly not 
significantly greater than 1 mile and 10%, respectively. However, significance maps 
created using nonparametric regression and simultaneous confidence bands revealed 
variations in the locations where children eligible for public insurance had significantly 
lower access than those not eligible. For some states such as Georgia and Minnesota, 
locations where these children had lower accessibility were concentrated in large urban 
areas despite such areas having high accessibility overall, suggesting the need to improve 
public insurance acceptance in these areas. For other states such as Tennessee and North 
Carolina, eligible children had lower accessibility and availability throughout the state, 
suggesting the need for statewide interventions. 
For adult primary care, our projections to year 2025 showed implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act in Georgia would overall decrease the percentage of unmet needed 
primary care visits, improving accessibility while reducing availability. Additionally 
expanding Medicaid does not substantially burden the privately-insured population. 
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Implementing a statewide Medicaid parity program or increasing the number of residency 
positions have little impact on reducing unmet need and improving access to care. 
Finally, for pediatric mental health, we found that the majority of psychosocial services 
available to publicly-insured children were concentrated to only a few locations. Only 15% 
of children received services from providers not associated with a mental health center or 
other organization.  We designed a system to match mental health specialists with primary 
care providers while considering both groups’ preferences using a novel extension of 
congestion games to evaluate the potential impact of collaborative care on access to 
psychosocial services. Results for New York indicated 49% of children could be granted 
access to collaborative services without greatly increasing mental health provider caseload. 
Overall, our results suggest interventions to improve access to primary care should be 
targeted for specific communities and that access to psychosocial services would benefit 
from increased community-based services or collaborative care. While our analyses were 
performed on only a select number of states, the models we use are flexible and can be 
extended to other states and even other healthcare services given appropriate data on the 
supply and need of those services. We hope the findings of this thesis and the methodology 
introduced will be used to make more informed health policy decisions. 
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APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2 
A.1 Sensitivity Analysis on Child Allocation 
In order to assess the sensitivity of the optimization model with respect to the assumption 
that 10% of the workload of internists’ and family practitioners' practices is allocated for 
children, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the model by varying these parameters. In 
particular, we run the model multiple times by varying the percentage of the internists 
workload devoted to children between 0% and 10%, and by varying the percentage of the 
family practitioners workload devoted to children between 7% and 15%. 
The analysis shows that the results of the optimization model are not very sensitive to a 
change in the values of these parameters, being the level of accessibility (i.e., distance), 
availability (i.e., congestion) and coverage (i.e., served visits) very close to each other when 
parameters’ values change.  
We report in Figure 19 the graphs for accessibility, availability and coverage at the state 
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Figure 19. State-level travel distance, congestion, and coverage versus family 
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Figure 19 continued. 
 
A.2 Experimental Settings for Total Caseload 
This section describes the experimental analysis we carry out to test the sensitivity of the 
optimization model with respect to providers’ workload parameter. Each model is run 50 
times, where the caseload of each provider is sampled each run. 
We use data from the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) [53] and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [52] to determine our 
sampling distributions. Specifically, based on surveys conducted in 2002, 2003, and 2006, 
the HRSA data reports Average Patient Care Hours Worked per Week by General Internal 
Medicine Physicians, by age class and gender in full-time equivalent (FTE) units. By 
considering a work schedule of 45 hours per week, 50 weeks per year, and an average visit 
duration equal to 16 minutes (equivalent to a panel size of 2500 patients per year per 
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physician [39] and approximately 8400 visits per year), we derived the annual number of 
visits per physician by age and gender  (Table 23). 
OECD provides the number of physicians in each of five age classes separated by gender 
for the United States in 2013 using data from the American Medical Association (Table 
24). We fit a Normal Distribution to the data for each gender by calculating the sample 
mean and standard deviation assuming frequency weights are at the midpoints of each age 
interval (Figure 20). 
Table 23. Annual number of visits per primary care physician by age and gender. 
Total Number of yearly visits   
Age Male Female 
<40 8736 6888 
40-44 8988 7224 
45-49 9240 7644 
50-54 9912 8064 
55-59 9576 7896 
60-64 8904 6216 
> 64 7056 7560 
Table 24. Physicians by age and gender (from OECD). 
Number of Physicians 
Age Male Female 
<35 71867 13174 
35-44 112769 83115 
45-54 130264 67710 
55-64 137081 45240 







Figure 20. Age distribution with fitted normal curve for male physicians and for 
female physicians. 
For our sampling procedure, we follow three steps: 
First, we determine the gender of each physician at physician location j. A physician’s 
gender can be found in the NPI database [38]. However, not all physicians list their gender. 
We use the NPI database to obtain the gender of all physicians at j who have their gender 
listed. We then calculate the proportion of physicians who are female at j based on the 
providers who have their genders listed.  If no providers’ genders are known at j, we instead 
use the 2013 national ratio of 0.3409 female found in the OECD data table. Then for each 
physician of unknown gender, we generate a random number between 0 and 1. If the 
number is less than the proportion female at j, we say that physician is female. Otherwise 
we say they are male. 
Second, we generate a random age for each physician based on their gender by sampling 
from the corresponding Normal Distribution depicted in Figure 20. Finally, using each 
physician’s sampled age and gender, we find the total yearly visits for that physician in 
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLYMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 
B.1 Supply Model Validation 
This section presents a comparison of our results with existing results in the literature for 
a validation of our supply projection model. 
To validate the Student Module, we compared our output with data from the Georgia Board 
for Physician Workforce’s Graduate Medical Education Survey Reports, 2002-2013 [202]. 
Results are shown in Figure 21 for different growth scenarios. We found the number of 
Georgia GME graduates projected by the Student Module to be comparable to the number 
of graduates recorded in previous years. 
 
Figure 21. Number of Georgia GME graduates, 2002-2025. 
To validate the Workforce Module, we compare our predicted growth in physicians to 
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Because the 2014 numbers were not explicitly given, we assumed a constant increase in 
providers per year between 2010 and 2015 for the HRSA 2006 study and between 2010 
and 2020 for the HRSA 2013 study. Results including the different scenarios for growth in 
GME entrants are given in Table 25 and Table 26. Our projected increase is consistent with 
those produced by HIS Inc. and HRSA. 
Table 25. Percent growth in primary care providers, 2013-2025. 
Source Physicians in 2013 Physicians in 2025 Percent Growth (%) 
GA model (0% growth) 6,699 7,314 9.1 
GA model (12% growth) 6,699 7,376 10.1 
GA model (30% growth) 6,699 7,483 11.7 
IHS 240,800 266,700 10.8 
Table 26. Percent growth in primary care providers, 2014-2020. 
Source Physicians in 2014 Physicians in 2020 Percent Growth (%) 
GA model (0% growth) 6,794 7,241 6.6 
GA model (12% growth) 6,814 7,290 6.9 
GA model (30% growth) 6,800 7,285 7.3 
HRSA 2013 211,320 220,800 4.5 
HRSA 2006 – Total PCPs 280,998 298,680 6.3 
HRSA 2006 – FTE PCPs 205,204 216,890 5.7 
 
We additionally compared the age distribution projected for year 2020 by our Workforce 
Module with the age distribution of all physicians at the national level in 2020 as given in 
the HRSA 2006 study [203] and by [68] considering initial numbers both from the US 
Census Bureau Current Population Survey (CPS) and from the American Medical 




Figure 22. Primary care provider age distribution, 2020. 
 
B.2 Medicaid Insurance Eligibility Forecast Model 
This section details the steps taken to produce estimates of the number of adults eligible 
for Medicaid each year between 2013 and 2025 under each of the three ACA 
implementation scenarios. That is, our intended output is: 
- 𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝑁𝐸
: The number of nonelderly adults eligible for Medicaid under non-
expansion in county c in year t 
- 𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝐸
: The number of nonelderly adults eligible for Medicaid under expansion in 
county c in year t 
- 𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝑁𝑃
: The number of nonelderly adults eligible for Medicaid under the no-ACA 
implementation scenario in county c in year t 
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The Medicaid eligibility criteria are the same under the no-ACA implementation scenario 
and the no-expansion scenario, hence 𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝑁𝑃 = 𝑇𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝑁𝐸 . 
To obtain these values, the following data are needed: 
- 𝐴𝑐,𝑡
𝑀 and 𝐴𝑐,𝑡
𝐹 : Median age for males and females in county c in year t (2012 ACS 
Table B01002) 
- 𝐶𝑐,𝑡: Proportion of the population age 25 and over with a bachelor’s degree or higher 
in county c in year t (2012 ACS Table S2301) 
- 𝐷𝑐,𝑡: Average gross rent in county c in year t (2012 ACS Table B25064) 
-  𝐸𝑐,𝑡
1 and 𝐸𝑐,𝑡
2 : Average household size over 18 and under 18 in county c in year t 
(2010 Census Table PCT7) 
- 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 and 𝐺𝑐,𝑡
𝑁 : Total population and total non-elderly adult population in county c in 
year t (Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget Population Projections) 
- 𝑞𝑐,𝑡: Proportion of the total population that is non-elderly adults in county c in year 
t (2010 Census Table PCT3) 
- 𝑝𝑐,𝑡
𝑀 , 𝑝𝑐,𝑡
𝐹  and 𝑝𝑐,𝑡: Proportion of male adults, proportion of female adults, and 
proportion of all adults that are non-elderly in county c in year t (2010 Census Table 
PCT3) 
- 𝐻𝑐,𝑡: Proportion of Caucasian residents in county c in year t (2012 ACS Table 
B02001) 
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- 𝐼𝑐,𝑡: Median income in county c in year t (ESRI) 
- 𝑄𝑐,𝑡: Population in group quarters in county c in year t (2012 ACS Table B26001) 
- 𝑆𝑐,𝑡: Number of non-elderly adult householders living alone in county c in year t 
(2012 ACS Table B11010) 
- 𝑇𝑐,𝑡: Number of nonfamily householders not living alone in county c in year t (2012 
ACS Table B11010) 
- 𝑢𝑐,𝑡: Proportion of adults with income less than 138% of the FPL in county c in 
year t (2012 ACS Table B17024) 
The method for obtaining the final outputs takes the following steps: 
1. Forecast family household counts 
Multiple regression models were used to forecast the following: 
- 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,∙
𝑀𝐴: The number of households with married families with children under 
18 in county c during year t in all income ranges 
- 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,∙
𝑆𝐹 : The number of households with single fathers with children under 18 
in county c during year t in all income ranges 
- 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,∙
𝑆𝑀: The number of households with single mothers with children under 
18 in county c during year t in all income ranges 
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- 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,∙
𝑁𝐶 : The number of family households with no children under 18 in county 
c during year t in all income ranges 
The regression models are as follows: 
- log 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,∙
𝑀𝐴 = .0253 log 𝐶𝑐,𝑡 + .0393 log 𝐷𝑐,𝑡 + .1329𝐸𝑐,𝑡
2 − .0060𝐸𝑐,𝑡
1 +




1 + 1.1509 log 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 
- log 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,∙
𝑆𝑀 = −.0964 log 𝐶𝑐,𝑡 − .0466 log 𝐷𝑐,𝑡 + .0370𝐸𝑐,𝑡
2 − .0582𝐸𝑐,𝑡
1 +







1.1796 log 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 + .0346𝐻𝑐,𝑡 + .0024 log 𝐼𝑐,𝑡 
The predictors 𝐶𝑐,𝑡, 𝐸𝑐,𝑡
1 , 𝐸𝑐,𝑡
2 , are assumed constant with time through year 2025 whereas 
the other predictors had to be forecasted for future years. 𝐴𝑐,𝑡
𝑀  and 𝐻𝑐,𝑡 are forecasted using 
Holt-Winters method with historical median age data from the UN database. 𝐷𝑐,𝑡 and 
𝐼𝑐,𝑡 are forecasted using Holt-Winters method with historical Consumer Price Index data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Forecasts for 𝐺𝑐,𝑡 are given in the census tables. 
2. Split the household count into income ranges 
Each of the resulting household counts is divided into income-to-poverty (IPL) ranges 
using the 2012 household proportions from ACS Table B17022. For example, the 
proportion of married adults in county c that are in income range i is 𝑁𝑐,2012,𝑖
𝑀𝐴 𝑁𝑐,2012,∙
𝑀𝐴⁄  with 
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𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝐿 ≤ 0.37
2, 𝑖𝑓 0.37 < 𝐼𝑃𝐿 ≤ 1.00
3, 𝑖𝑓 1.00 < 𝐼𝑃𝐿 ≤ 1.38
 
3. Calculate the number of eligible adults in family households 
Define 𝐹𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝑁𝐸
to be the number of nonelderly adults living in family households that are 
eligible for Medicaid in county c and year t under the non-expansion scenario and 𝐹𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝐸
to 
be the same number under the Medicaid-expansion scenario.  These numbers can be 













𝐹 ) ∗ (𝑁𝑐,𝑡,1
𝑀𝐴 + 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,2
𝑀𝐴 + 𝑁𝑐,𝑡,3














𝑁𝐶 )  
4. Calculate the number of adults in group quarters and nonfamily households 
The number of non-elderly adults 𝑁𝐹𝑐,𝑡 living in group quarters and nonfamily households 
in county c and year t is determined as follows. 
For year 2012 we have: 
- 𝑁𝐹𝑐,2012 = (𝑄𝑐,2012 ∗ 𝑞𝑐,2010) + 𝑆𝑐,2012 + (𝑇𝑐,2012 ∗ 𝐸𝑐,2010
1 ∗ 𝑝𝑐,2010) 
For future years, we assume the ratio of non-elderly adults in group quarters and nonfamily 
households to all non-elderly adults remains the same: 
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- 𝑁𝐹𝑐,𝑡 = (
𝑁𝐹𝑐,2012
𝐺𝑐,2012
𝑁 ) ∗ 𝐺𝑐,𝑡
𝑁  
5. Calculate the number of eligible adults in group quarters and nonfamily households 
We assume only adults in family households have children under age 18. Thus, adults in 
group quarters and nonfamily households are only eligible for Medicaid under the 
Medicaid-expansion scenario. 
- 𝑁𝐹𝑐,𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐷,𝐸 = 𝑁𝐹𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑢𝑐,2012 










Final values are given at the county level. These are distributed to census tracts according 




APPENDIX C. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4 
Table 27 shows how taxonomy codes were classified into the 11 different provider 
categories used in our analysis. The National Uniform Claim Committee structures 
taxonomy codes into three levels: Provider Type, Classification, and Area of 
Specialization. Each of our provider categories consists of all taxonomy codes with an Area 
of Specialization listed under the corresponding “Included Specializations” or with a 
Classification listed under the corresponding “Included Classifications” except for codes 
that also have an Area of Specialization listed under the corresponding “Excluded 
Specializations”. For example, federally qualified health centers (taxonomy code 
261QF0400X) and rural health clinics (261QR1300X) are both specializations listed under 
the Classification Clinic/Center (261Q00000X) and would therefore be categorized as 
‘Other Care Centers’. 
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1   Counselor   
Social Worker 
(SW) 
1   Social Worker   









Clinical Nurse Specialist 
Marriage and Family Therapist, 
Psychoanalyst, Behavior Analyst 
  









Clinical Nurse Specialist 
Psychiatry & Neurology, Psychologist, 
Clinical Neuropsychologist, Counselor, 
Social Worker, Marriage and Family 



















Agency; Psychiatric Residential 
Treatment Facility; Community Based 
Residential Treatment Facility, Mental 
Illness; Residential Treatment Facility, 
Emotionally Disturbed Children; 

















1   
Registered Nurse, Nurse Practitioner, 
Clinical Nurse Specialist, Physician 
Assistant, General Practice, Family 
Medicine, Internal Medicine, 














with Special Qualifications 
in Child Neurology, 
Clinical Neurophysiologist, 
Neuromuscular Medicine 
(Psychiatry & Neurology), 
Pain Medicine (Psychiatry 
& Neurology), Sports 
Medicine (Psychiatry & 
Neurology), Vascular 
Neurology (Psychiatry & 
Neurology) 
Art Therapist, Dance Therapist, 
Developmental Therapist, 
Kinesiotherapist, Massage Therapist, 
Music Therapist, Occupational 
Therapist, Occupational Therapy 
Assistant, Orthotist, Pedorthist, 
Physical Therapist, Physical Therapy 
Assistant, Prosthetist, Recreation 
Therapist, Rehabilitation Counselor, 
Rehabilitation Practitioner, 
Respiratory Therapist Certified, 
Respiratory Therapist Registered, 
Poetry Therapists, Speech Language 
Pathologist,  Physical Medicine & 
Rehabilitation, Pain Medicine 
  










(Psychiatry & Neurology), 
Pain Medicine (Psychiatry 
& Neurology), Sports 
Medicine (Psychiatry & 
Neurology), Vascular 
Neurology (Psychiatry & 
Neurology) 
Registered Nurse, Nurse Practitioner, 
Clinical Nurse Specialist, Physician 
Assistant, General Practice, Family 
Medicine, Internal Medicine, 
Obstetrics & Gynocology, Pediatrics, 
Art Therapist, Dance Therapist, 
Developmental Therapist, 
Kinesiotherapist, Massage Therapist, 
Music Therapist, Occupational 
Therapist, Occupational Therapy 
Assistant, Orthotist, Pedorthist, 
Physical Therapist, Physical Therapy 
Assistant, Prosthetist, Recreation 
Therapist, Rehabilitation Counselor, 
Rehabilitation Practitioner, 
Respiratory Therapist Certified, 
Respiratory Therapist Registered, 
Poetry Therapists, Speech Language 
Pathologist,  Physical Medicine & 
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1,2   
Multi-Specialty Group; Single Specialty 
Group; Day Training, Developmentally 
Disabled Services; Early Intervention 
Provider Agency; Home Health Agency; 
Home Infusion Agency; Hospice Care, 
Community Based; In Home Supportive 
Care Agency; Local Education Agency; 
Nursing Care Agency; PACE Provider 
Organization; Public Health or Welfare 
Agency; Supports Brokerage; Voluntary 
or Charitable Agency; Alzheimer 
Center/Dementia Center/ Dementia 
Special Care Unit; Assisted Living 
Facility; Custodial Care Facility; Hospice, 
Inpatient; Intermediate Care Facility, 
Mentally Retarded; Intermediate Care, 
Mental Illness; Nursing 
Facility/Intermediate Care Facility; 
Skilled Nursing Facility; Community 
Based Residential Treatment Facility, 
Mental Retardation and/or 
Developmental Disabilities; Residential 
Treatment Facility, Mental Retardation 
and/or Developmental Disabilities; 
Residential Treatment Facility, Physical 
Disabilities; Substance Abuse Disorder 
Rehabilitation Facility; Respite Care; 
Clinic/Center; Epilepsy Unit; 
Rehabilitation Unit; Rehabilitation, 
Substance Use Disorder Unit; Chronic 
Disease Hospital; General Acute Care 
Hospital; Long Term Care Hospital; 
Military Hospital; Rehabilitation 
Hospital; Religious Nonmedical Health 
Care Institution; Special Hospital 









APPENDIX D. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 5 
D.1 Proofs for Nash Equilibrium Existence 
In this section, we provide the necessary background for the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 
regarding the existence of a pure equilibrium. For this purpose, we allow players to 
iteratively change their strategy to one that will result in their lowest cost given the current 
state of the game. Specifically, we define a step 𝑠 (𝑠 = 1,2, …) as the act of a single player 
changing strategy or of a newly added player playing her initial strategy. We define stage 
𝑠 as the state of the game (i.e. the values of all variables determined by σ) after step 𝑠. 
Stage 𝑠 = 0 represents the initial game state before any players move. When referring to a 
variable at a specific state, we use superscripts (σ𝑖
𝑠 is player 𝑖’s strategy at stage 𝑠, 𝑓𝑖
𝑠 is 
player 𝑖’s final cost at stage 𝑠, etc.). We further define 𝑓𝑖𝑗(σ
𝑠) as the cost player 𝑖 will incur 
if it moves to resource 𝑗 during step 𝑠 + 1. We say resource 𝑗 is player 𝑖’s least-cost 
resource during stage 𝑠 if σ𝑖
𝑠 = 𝑗 and 𝑓𝑖
𝑠 ≤ 𝑓𝑖𝑗′(σ
𝑠) ∀𝑗′ ∈ Σ𝑖. Finally, we say a game is at 
equilibrium at stage 𝑠, if players cannot reduce their cost by unilaterally changing their 
strategy (i.e. 𝑓𝑖
𝑠 ≤ 𝑓𝑖𝑗(σ
𝑠) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑗 ∈ Σ𝑖). We breakdown the proof of Theorem 1 into 
four lemmas. 
When a player proposes to a saturated resource, the resource will accommodate that player 
if her rank at that resource is lower than the rank of at least one player currently 
accommodated by that resource. We define a resource 𝑗’s cutoff rank 𝑝𝑗 as the rank a player 
must be below in order to be accommodated by 𝑗. That is, 
 134 
𝑝𝑗 = {
max {𝑝𝑖𝑗|𝜎𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑖 is accommodated}, 𝑗 is saturated
∞, 𝑗 is unsaturated
 
If a player gets accommodated by a saturated resource, for the resource to stay within its 
capacity, the highest-ranked accommodated player at that resource must be displaced, 
meaning the player will no longer be accommodated and her incurred cost will rise to 
infinity. If a player accommodated by a saturated resource decides to change her strategy 
(i.e., leave her current resource and newly propose to a different resource), that saturated 
resource must immediately accommodate the lowest-ranked player that is proposing to it 
but had not been accommodated, if any such player exists. 
The next lemma shows that if initially all players are at equilibrium and a new player has 
proposed to her least-cost resource, at each stage, only one resource’s players will have an 
incentive to change strategies. 
Lemma 1: Suppose a congestion game is at equilibrium.  If a new player 𝑖𝑛 joins to the 
game and proposes to her least-cost resource 𝑗1 at step 1, either the game remains at 
equilibrium, or both the following hold: (1) the only players that could achieve lower cost 
changing strategies at the next step are also at 𝑗1 and (2) once one of those players leaves 
𝑗1 for a different resource 𝑗2, all players except those at 𝑗2 will again be playing their least-
cost resource. 
Proof. If cost incurred for each player is still minimum after player 𝑖𝑛 proposes to 𝑗1, the 
game remains at equilibrium. We consider the case when the game has not remained at 
equilibrium. Note because an additional player was added to resource 𝑗1, we have 𝑛𝑗1
1 ≥
𝑛𝑗1
0  and 𝑛𝑗
1 = 𝑛𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗1. Consider the player 𝑖 at some resource 𝑗
′ ≠ 𝑗1. Since player costs 
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1)). Thus players not at 𝑗1 are still matched to their lowest cost resource, so any 
player that may want to move must be at 𝑗1. This shows (1). To show (2), we consider two 
cases: 
1. 𝑗1 was initially unsaturated 
2. 𝑗1 was initially saturated 
In the first case, let any player 𝑖 at resource 𝑗1 move to some other resource 𝑗2 at the next 
step. Then we have 𝑛𝑗
2 = 𝑛𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗2 and 𝑛𝑗2
2 ≥ 𝑛𝑗2
0 . Additionally, 𝑝𝑗
2 = 𝑝𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗2 and 
𝑝𝑗2
2 ≤ 𝑝𝑗2
0 . This means all congestions and cutoff ranks stay the same as they were initially 
at every resource except at 𝑗2 (whose congestion does not decrease and cutoff rank does 
not increase). Since all players were initially matched to their least-cost resource, all 
players not at 𝑗2 must still achieve their lowest cost. Note as a consequence of this, if the 
game is still not at equilibrium, the next player to change strategy must be at 𝑗2. 
In the second case, a single player 𝑖 at 𝑗1 will be displaced by player 𝑖𝑛. Note the other 
players at 𝑗1 would retain their lowest-possible costs since 𝑛𝑗
1 = 𝑛𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ∈ ℛ and 𝑝𝑗
1 =
𝑝𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗1 (i.e. all congestions and cutoff ranks at the other resources would not have 
changed from their initial state), so the displaced player must change strategy. Let the 
displaced player 𝑖 move to some other resource 𝑗2 at the next step. Then we have 𝑛𝑗
2 =
𝑛𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗2 and 𝑛𝑗2
2 ≥ 𝑛𝑗2
0 . Additionally, 𝑝𝑗
2 = 𝑝𝑗
0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗1, 𝑗2, 𝑝𝑗1
2 < 𝑝𝑗1
0 , and 𝑝𝑗2
2 ≤ 𝑝𝑗2
0 . 
Again, this means all congestions stay the same as they were initially except at 𝑗2 (where 
it does not decrease), and all cutoff ranks stay the same as they were initially except at 𝑗1 
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and 𝑗2 (which do not increase). Since all players were initially matched to their least-cost 
resource, all players not at 𝑗2 must still achieve their lowest cost. ∎ 
As a consequence of this lemma, after each step, it is enough to focus on the behavior of 
the players at the resource that just got added a player. This leads to the following 
definition: 
Definition 1: The addition of a player starts a chain, that is a sequence of resources where 
the 𝑘-th resource in the sequence is the resource that a player newly proposed to at step 
𝑘. If 𝑘 > 1, that player would have previously been proposing the 𝑘 − 1-th resource in the 
sequence. A resource can appear multiple times in the chain. 
An example chain resulting from a new player 𝑖1 proposing to a resource 𝑗1 is depicted in 
Figure 23. At each proceeding step 𝑘, a player 𝑖𝑘 leaves her previous resource 𝑗𝑘−1 to be 
accommodated by a lower-cost resource 𝑗𝑘. The chain ends after step 𝑛 when no players 
can achieve lower cost by leaving resource 𝑗𝑛. 
 
Figure 23. Chain Consisting of Resources 𝒋𝟏,𝒋𝟐,𝒋𝟑,...,𝒋𝒌−𝟏,𝒋𝒌,...,𝒋𝒏 
Given a chain, we can know the congestions of every resource relative to its initial value. 
 137 
Corollary 1: Suppose resource 𝑗 is added to the chain at steps 𝑆 = 𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛. Then for 
all steps 𝑠 ∉ 𝑆, 𝑛𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑛𝑗
0. For steps 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, if resource 𝑗 was initially saturated, 𝑛𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑛𝑗
0, 
and if resource 𝑗 was initially unsaturated, 𝑛𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑛𝑗
0 + 1. 
Proof. From the definition of chain, the players proposing to 𝑗 will remain unchanged until 
𝑗 is added to the chain, meaning its congestion will remain 𝑛𝑗
0 until that first occurs, if that 
occurs at all. Say 𝑗 is added to the chain at step 𝑠1. That is, 𝑛𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑛𝑗
0 ∀𝑠 < 𝑠1. Then at step 
𝑠1, a player 𝑖 will newly propose to resource 𝑗. 
If 𝑗 was saturated (i.e. 𝑛𝑗
0 = 𝐾𝑗), that player would either not be accommodated (indicating 
the game is at equilibrium) or that player would displace a previously-accommodated 
player. This means the congestion will remain the same (i.e. 𝑛𝑗
𝑠1 = 𝑛𝑗
0). If 𝑠1 is not the last 
step, by Lemma 1, the displaced player must leave 𝑗. A displaced player leaving does not 




If 𝑗 was unsaturated (i.e. 𝑛𝑗
0 < 𝐾𝑗), player 𝑖 would be accommodated, causing the 
congestion to increase by 1 (i.e. 𝑛𝑗
𝑠1 = 𝑛𝑗
0 + 1). Again if 𝑠1 is not the last step, by Lemma 
1, a player must leave 𝑗 at the next step, reducing the congestion by 1. That is, 𝑛𝑗
𝑠1+1 =
𝑛𝑗
𝑠1 − 1 = 𝑛𝑗
0. 
Thus in both the saturated and unsaturated case, we have 𝑛𝑗
𝑠1+1 = 𝑛𝑗
0. Again by definition 
of chain, the congestion at 𝑗 will remain unaffected until the next step 𝑗 appears in the chain 
if such a step exists. If there is no such step, we have 𝑛𝑗
𝑠 = 𝑛𝑗
𝑠1+1 = 𝑛𝑗
0 ∀𝑠 ≥ 𝑠1 + 1. 
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0 ∀𝑠 ∈ [𝑠1, 𝑠2 − 1]. Then at step 𝑠2 the same consequences from a player newly 
proposing to 𝑗 will occur. ∎ 
As a consequence of this corollary, a resource that was saturated at stage 0 will remain 
saturated for all stages, and a resource that was unsaturated at stage 0 will remain 
unsaturated for all stages not immediately following a step where a player newly proposed 
to that resource (i.e. the step the resource appears in the chain). Thus, we can characterize 
each resource by its initial saturation. 
We can additionally characterize subsequences of a chain. 
Definition 2: We refer to any contiguous subsequence of the chain where the first resource 
was either the first resource in the chain or saturated at stage 0, the last resource was 
either the last resource in the chain or saturated at stage 0, and any resources in between 
were unsaturated at stage 0 as a leg of the chain. The length of a leg refers to the number 
of these unsaturated resources. 
An example chain with four legs is depicted in Figure 24.  In this figure, Shaded circles are 
saturated resources while unshaded circles are unsaturated resources. The four legs consist 




Figure 24. An example chain consisting of seven resources and four legs. 
We can also find limits for the length of a chain. 
Lemma 2: Whenever a player newly proposes to and is accommodated by a saturated 
resource, the cutoff rank of that resource must decrease. 
Proof. Let 𝑖1 be the player, 𝑗 the saturated resource, and 𝑠 the step in which 𝑖1 proposed to 
𝑗. Additionally, let ℐ𝓈−1 and ℐ𝓈 denote the set of all players accommodated by 𝑗 during 
stages 𝑠 − 1 and 𝑠 respectively. Before 𝑖1 proposed, 𝑗’s cutoff rank 𝑝𝑗
𝑠−1 is by definition 
𝑗’s ranking of its least-preferred (or equivalently, its highest-ranked) accommodated 
player, say 𝑖2. That is, 𝑝𝑗
𝑠−1 = 𝑝𝑖2𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∀𝑖 ∈ ℐ
𝓈−1 ∖ {𝑖2}. For 𝑖1 to be accommodated by 
𝑗 during step 𝑠, it is required that 𝑝𝑖1𝑗 < 𝑝𝑗
𝑠−1. When 𝑖1 is accommodated, 𝑖2 must be 
displaced. Therefore we have 𝑝𝑗
𝑠−1 > max(𝑝𝑖𝑗: 𝑖 ∈ {𝑖1} ∪ ℐ
𝓈−1 ∖ {𝑖2}) = max(𝑝𝑖𝑗: 𝑖 ∈
ℐ𝓈) = 𝑝𝑗
𝑠.∎ 
Lemma 3: Within a chain, a player cannot return to a resource from which they have been 
displaced. 
Proof. If a player 𝑖 is displaced from resource 𝑗 at step 𝑠, the cutoff rank of 𝑗 must decrease, 
as described in Lemma 2. (i.e. we have 𝑝𝑗
𝑠 < 𝑝𝑗
𝑠−1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗). For player 𝑖 to return to resource 
𝑗 at some future step 𝑠 + 𝑑, we would need 𝑝𝑖𝑗 < 𝑝𝑗
𝑠+𝑑−1 ≤ 𝑝𝑗
𝑠−1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗, a contradiction. 
Note the middle inequality holds because each step, if a player is added to a saturated 
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resource, it must displace another player with a higher rank 𝑝𝑖𝑗 thereby decreasing the 
cutoff rank.∎ 
Lemma 4: Within a leg, a player cannot return to an unsaturated resource they have left. 
Proof. Suppose at step 𝑡, a player 𝑖 changed strategies from initially unsaturated resource 
𝑗 to unsaturated resource 𝑗′. This means 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡 ) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡−1). We show through 
contradiction that player 𝑖 will not return to 𝑗 at some future step 𝑡 + 𝑑 in the leg. 
Suppose player 𝑖 did switch to resource 𝑗 from some other resource 𝑗′′ at step 𝑡 + 𝑑. Let 
𝑡∗ ∈ [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑 − 1] be the earliest step such that σ𝑖
𝑠 = 𝑗′′ for all stages 𝑠  in the interval 
[𝑡∗, 𝑡 + 𝑑 − 1]. Note 𝑖 would only switch to 𝑗 at step 𝑡 + 𝑑 if its cost decreased. That is, 
𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡+𝑑) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗′′(𝑛𝑗′′
𝑡+𝑑−1). We have three cases: 
1. 𝑗′′ = 𝑗′ 
2. 𝑗′′ ≠ 𝑗′ and σ𝑖
𝑡∗−1 = 𝑗′  (i.e. player 𝑖 proposed to 𝑗′ at stage 𝑡∗ − 1) 
3. 𝑗′′ ≠ 𝑗′ and σ𝑖
𝑡∗−1 ≠ 𝑗′ 
The resources appearing in the chain at each step are given in Table 28. Recall by 
definition, the same resource cannot appear in the chain across consecutive steps. Also, by 
Corollary 1, if some resource 𝑘 appears in the chain at steps 𝑠1 and 𝑠2, we have 𝑛𝑘
𝑠1 = 𝑛𝑘
𝑠2. 






Table 28. Resource appearing in the chain sequence per step, under three cases. 
Step 𝒕 − 𝟏 𝒕 … 𝒕∗ − 𝟏 𝒕∗ … 𝒕 + 𝒅 − 𝟏 𝒕 + 𝒅 
Case 1 𝑗 𝑗′ … Unknown 𝑗′ … 𝑗′ 𝑗 
Case 2 𝑗 𝑗′ … 𝑗′ 𝑗′′ … 𝑗′′ 𝑗 
Case 3 𝑗 𝑗′ … Not 𝑗′ 𝑗′′ … 𝑗′′ 𝑗 
 
In the first case, 𝑑𝑖𝑗′′(𝑛𝑗′′
𝑡+𝑑−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡+𝑑−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡 ) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡+𝑑), 
contradicting that player 𝑖's cost decreased at step 𝑡 + 𝑑. Note the second equality holds 
because resource 𝑗′ appears in the chain sequence at both step 𝑡 + 𝑑 − 1 and step 𝑡, 
meaning it has the same congestion at both those stages as shown in Corollary 1. The third 
equality holds for similar reasons with regards to resource 𝑗 at steps 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 + 𝑑. 
In the second case, for 𝑖 to have switched to 𝑗′′ rather than staying at 𝑗′ at step 𝑡∗, we must 
have 𝑑𝑖𝑗′′(𝑛𝑗′′
𝑡∗ ) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡∗−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡∗ + 1) (i.e. the cost must be lower). Then, 
𝑑𝑖𝑗′′(𝑛𝑗′′
𝑡+𝑑−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗′′(𝑛𝑗′′
𝑡∗ ) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡∗−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡 ) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡+𝑑), 
resulting in the same contradiction. 
In the third case, for 𝑖 to have switched to 𝑗′′ rather than switching to 𝑗′ at step 𝑡∗, we must 
have 𝑑𝑖𝑗′′(𝑛𝑗′′
𝑡∗ ) ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡∗−1 + 1) (i.e. the cost cannot be higher than it would have been 
had it switched to 𝑗′ at step 𝑡∗). Note 𝑛𝑗′
𝑡∗−1 + 1 = 𝑛𝑗′
𝑡−1 + 1 by Corollary 1, and 𝑛𝑗′
𝑡−1 +
1 = 𝑛𝑗′




𝑡∗−1 + 1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗′(𝑛𝑗′
𝑡 ) < 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡−1) = 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑛𝑗
𝑡+𝑑), again resulting in the 
contradiction. ∎ 
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Using the previous lemmas, we can now prove the existence of an equilibrium for the 
player-specific singleton capacitated congestion games described in Section 5.3 when 
player cost functions are non-decreasing with congestion.  We start proving that we can 
add one player to a game already at equilibrium and reach a new equilibrium in a finite 
number of steps. We then use induction to show we can find an equilibrium for any given 
game. 
Proof of Theorem 1. If player 𝑃𝑛 cannot be accommodated by any resource because all 
resources are saturated and 𝑃𝑛 is not preferred over any accommodated player, match it to 
the first resource. The resulting strategy tuple σ defines an equilibrium as congestions and 
cutoff ranks and therefore costs for remaining players would not change, and player 𝑃𝑛 
would achieve its lowest possible cost of infinity. 
Now consider the case where 𝑃𝑛 can be accommodated. We aim to show the resulting chain 
will consist of a finite number of finitely-long legs, so the game must have an equilibrium. 
Specifically, Lemma 3 showed players cannot return to resources they have been displaced 
from. This means each saturated resource can appear at most 𝑛 times in the chain, limiting 
the number of legs. Additionally, Lemma 4 showed within a leg, a player cannot return to 
an unsaturated resource they have left. Again, this means each resource can appear at most 
𝑛 times within a leg, limiting the length of the leg. ∎ 
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove this theorem using induction on the number of players. 
When 𝑛 = 1, we can find an equilibrium by allowing the single player to propose to its 
least-cost resource. That is, σ1 = arg min
j∈Σ1
𝑑1𝑗(1). Assume the theorem holds for all 𝑛 =
1,2, … , 𝑘. We consider the case where the game has 𝑘 + 1. By the induction hypothesis, a 
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game with 𝑘 players has an equilibrium. It is enough to show we can add the final player 
to that at-equilibrium game and again reach an equilibrium. This is simply an application 
of Theorem 1. ∎ 
D.2 Proofs for Finding a Minimum Cost Pure Equilibrium 
Proof of Theorem 3. We provide a proof by a reduction from Minimum Vertex Cover, a 
well-known strongly NP-hard problem [204, 205]. Consider the graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) where 
𝑉 ≔ {𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑚} and 𝐸 ≔ {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛}, respectively, denote its vertices and edges. 
In the following, we construct an instance of the congestion game whose best pure 
equilibrium coincides with the minimum vertex cover of 𝐺. The primary idea is to consider 
the vertices and edges of the graph as resources and players of the game, respectively. 
• ℛ ≔ {𝑉, ?̅?} where ?̅? ≔ {𝑣1̅̅ ̅, 𝑣2̅̅ ̅, … , 𝑣𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ }. This means that associated with the set of 
vertices 𝑉, we have considered a set ?̅?. All these vertices build up resources for the 
instance of our congestion game. 
• 𝒩 ≔ {𝐸, ?̅?} where ?̅? ≔ {(𝑣1, 𝑣1̅̅ ̅), (𝑣2, 𝑣2̅̅ ̅), … , (𝑣𝑚, 𝑣𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ )}. This is illustrated by an 
example in Figure 25. 
• For each 𝑖 ∈ ℛ, the action space is the vertices forming the edge 𝑖. Specifically, if 
(𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑙) ∈ 𝐸, then the player (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑙) is allowed to choose the resource 𝑣𝑘 or 𝑣𝑙. 
Similarly, for each (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅?, the player (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅)  is allowed to choose either the 
resource 𝑣𝑘 or 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅. 
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• 𝐾𝑗 ≔ 𝑛 + 𝑚 + 1. This means that each resource 𝑗 ∈ ℛ may accommodate 𝑛 + 𝑚 +
1 players. Since the total number of players is 𝑛 + 𝑚, this implies that no resource 
will ever be saturated under any strategy profile. 
• For each 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 and 𝑗 ∈ ℛ, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 may be arbitrarily assigned without affecting the set 
of equilibria of the game. The reason is that no resource will ever be saturated for 
this instance of the game, so a resource never needs to rank among those players 
who have proposed to it. 
• The players' cost function are as follows. For each (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑙) ∈ 𝐸, the player cost 
function is equal to zero for each possible action and congestion. More formally, 
for each congestion 𝑛 ∈ ℤ+,  
 𝑑(𝑣𝑘,𝑣𝑙),𝑣𝑘(𝑛) = 𝑑(𝑣𝑘,𝑣𝑙),𝑣𝑙(𝑛) = 0. (D.1) 
For each (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅?, the cost function is as follows: 
 𝑑(𝑣𝑘,𝑣𝑘̅̅̅̅ ),𝑣𝑘(𝑛) = {
0, 𝑛 ≤ 1
2, 𝑛 ≥ 2
 (D.2) 




Figure 25. An example of the game instance depicting the connection between 
resources (vertices) and players (edges) as used in the proof of Theorem 3. 
Note that this is a polynomial-time reduction of the minimum vertex cover to an instance 
of the congestion game. Now, we demonstrate that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between each feasible solution of the minimum vertex cover and pure equilibria of this 
game. For this purpose, let us represent a solution of the vertex cover by (𝑥𝑒1 , … , 𝑥𝑒𝑛) 
where 𝑥𝑒𝑘 denotes the assigned vertex to edge 𝑒𝑘 in the cover. Moreover, let us represent 
an equilibrium of the game by the vector 𝛔 ≔ (σ1, … , σ𝑛, σ𝑛+1, … , σ𝑛+𝑚). Consider the 
following transformation: 
 σ𝑖 ≔ 𝑥𝑒𝑖                                    ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} (D.4) 
 
σ𝑛+𝑖 ≔ {
?̅?𝑖 , if ∃𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}: 𝑥𝑒𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖
𝑥, otherwise
           ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚} (D.5) 
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This implies that given a solution of the vertex cover problem, in its associated congestion 
game, each edge in 𝐸 should choose the same vertex as the vertex cover solution, and each 
edge (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅? should choose 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅ if and only if 𝑣𝑘 has already been chosen by some 
edge in 𝐸. 
It can easily be shown that 𝛔 is an equilibrium of the game. For this purpose, note that 
equation (D.1) implies that all players in 𝐸  satisfy the equilibrium conditions under any 
arbitrary selection of the vertices, including the strategy profile 𝛔.  For each player 
(𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅?, equations (D.2)-(D.3)  implies that  the equilibrium condition is satisfied if 
and only if  (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) chooses 𝑣𝑘  whenever the congestion of this vertex is 1, i.e.,  𝑣𝑘 has 
not been chosen by any player in 𝐸, and it follows from equation (D.5)  that this condition 
is satisfied at the strategy profile 𝛔, so 𝛔 is an equilibrium. 
So far, we have shown that each solution of the vertex cover is associated with an 
equilibrium of the game through the transformation (D.4) and (D.5). On the other hand, 
given an equilibrium 𝛔, it is trivial to find a solution of the vertex cover by only considering 
the first 𝑛 components of 𝛔, i.e., 𝑥𝑒𝑖 ≔ σ𝑖 for each 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. 
Now, let us consider the problem of finding a best pure equilibrium induced by the 
objective function ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑛+𝑚
𝑖=1  where 𝑓𝑖 denotes the cost of player 𝑖. Note that it follows from 
equation (D.1) that 𝑓𝑖 = 0 for each 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. As noted earlier, under an equilibrium 𝛔, 
each (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅? chooses 𝑣𝑘  whenever the congestion of this vertex is 1, and this leads 
to 𝑓𝑛+𝑘 = 0; otherwise, (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅? chooses 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅, and then 𝑓𝑛+𝑘 = 1. Therefore, ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑛+𝑚
𝑖=𝑛+1  
is equal to the number of edges in ?̅? which have chosen its resource in ?̅?. Therefore, 
minimizing ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑛+𝑚
𝑖=1  is identical to minimizing the number of edges in ?̅? which have chosen 
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its resource in ?̅?. Once again we use the fact that the each (𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅) ∈ ?̅? chooses 𝑣𝑘̅̅ ̅  
whenever the congestion of 𝑣𝑘 is greater than or equal to 1, i.e., 𝑣𝑘 has been chosen by 
some players in 𝐸; therefore, number of edges in ?̅? which have chosen its resource in ?̅? is 
the same as the number of vertices in 𝑉 which have been chosen by an edge in 𝐸, which is 
the objective function of the minimum vertex cover problem.∎ 
Remark: Note that we use an uncapacitated instance of singleton congestion game in our 
computational complexity proof. This also implies that the same complexity result holds if 
the game is non-singleton. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Note that the condition ∑ 𝒦𝒿𝑗∈ℛ ≥ 𝑛 guarantees that each player is 
accommodated by some resource in an equilibrium. We show that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between pure equilibria of the game and feasible points of the polyhedron 
(5.1a)-(5.1o). 
⇒: Given an equilibrium σ = (σ1, σ2, … , σ𝑛), we can initially set 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1 if and only if 
σ𝑖 = 𝑗; otherwise let 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0. Then set 𝑐𝑗, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘, 𝑧𝑗𝑘, and 𝑓𝑖 by above-mentioned 
interpretation of the variables. We will set the value for 𝑜𝑖𝑗 and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 in the rest of this proof. 
We show that these values of the variables is feasible for (5.1a)-(5.1o), in the following. 
It immediately follows from the definition of the variables that constraint (5.1a)-(5.1e) and 
(5.1h)  are satisfied. Constraint (5.1g) is met since: (i) when 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1, then 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑘 if and 
only if 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1, and (ii) when 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0, the constraint is trivial. 
Constraints (5.1i)-(5.1l) enforces that no player is better off by a unilateral deviation. 
Specifically, constraint (5.1k) is met since when resource 𝑗 is unsaturated (i.e., 𝑧𝑗𝐾𝑗 = 0) 
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and σ𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, if player 𝑖 decides to unilaterally deviate by switching to resource 𝑗, then she 
will be accommodated by the resource, and her new cost, 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑗 + 1) =
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑘)𝑧𝑗(𝑘−1)𝑘∈𝒦𝒿 , is at least as large as her cost, 𝑓𝑖, under strategy profile σ. Note that if 
σ𝑖 = 𝑗 and resource 𝑗 is unsaturated, constraint (5.1k) is met because 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑗) ≤
𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑗 + 1) = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝑘)𝑧𝑗(𝑘−1)𝑘∈𝒦𝒿 , which holds since the cost function of each player is 
non-decreasing with congestion. 
When resource 𝑗 is saturated (i.e., 𝑧𝑗𝐾𝑗 = 1) and σ𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, if player 𝑖 decides to unilaterally 
deviate by switching to resource 𝑗, then there are two possible cases: (i) She is 
accommodated by  resource 𝑗, then let 𝑜𝑖𝑗 ≔ 1 and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ≔ 0. Therefore, player 𝑖's new cost 
is equal to 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝐾𝑗), which is at least as large as her current cost 𝑓𝑖. This implies that 
constraint (5.1j) is met. Moreover, constraint (5.1k) is trivially met. (ii) She is not 
accommodated by resource 𝑗, then let 𝑜𝑖𝑗 ≔ 0 and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ≔ 1. This implies that no player 
with a higher rank than player 𝑖 is accommodated by resource 𝑗, and hence, constraint 
(5.1k) is met, and constraint (5.1j) is trivially met. Constraint (5.1l) is met since at least 
either 𝑜𝑖𝑗 = 1 or 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1. Note that when resource $j$ is saturated (i.e., 𝑧𝑗𝐾𝑗 = 1) and σ𝑖 =
𝑗, we let 𝑜𝑖𝑗 ≔ 1 and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ≔ 0. Constraint (5.1j) is met since 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑗(𝐾𝑗), constraints (5.1k) 
and (5.1l) are trivial. 
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